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1. INTRODUCTION
When asked why the twentieth century was called the century of the
common man, Winston Churchill replied "because in it the common man
has suffered most."' In August 1915, a thirteen-year-old girl recounted the
following: A mob of Turkish police officers, soldiers, and civilians,
descended upon her city, Sungurlu, in modem-day Turkey.2 The Turks first
marched the adult males out of the town to torture and kill them. The
women and children were next; they were caravanned to a valley by a bridge
an hour and a half away. 4 "[W]ith axes, hatchets, shovels, and pitchforks,"
the Turks slaughtered and raped the women, and "dashed the little children
against the rocks."5 After nightfall, the young girl, half-alive, awoke among
the naked corpses.6 She searched through the bodies for her mother and two
sisters, calling them out by name, but only found their lifeless bodies
crushed beside each other.7 She "began to shake and sob uncontrollably."
"At dawn, a few ... cowherds crossing the bridge saw [her body] moving"
among the corpses and took her in.9
Between 1915 and 1923, one and one-half million Armenians, roughly
three-fourths of Ottoman Armenians, were killed by Ottoman Turks.'o "The
greatest torment," writes Richard Hovannisian, "was reserved for the women
and children," who were forced on a "death march" over mountains and
across the desert that lasted several months." Those who survived were
herded into open-air concentration camps. 12 Another half-million were
forcibly displaced from their historic homeland of twenty-five hundred
years.' 3 Many argue that this mass-murder and displacement was part of a
1. 1 MARTIN GILBERT, A HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, 1900-33, at 2 (1997).
2. GRIGORIs BALAKIAN, ARMENIAN GOLGOTHA: A MEMOIR OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE,
1915-1918, at 88 (Peter Balakian & Aris Sevag trans., 2009) (survivors' accounts of the Armenian
Genocide); see also Martin Gilbert, Twentieth-Century Genocides, in AMERICA AND THE ARMENIAN
GENOCIDE OF 1915 (Jay Winter ed., 2003) (historical background of the Armenian Genocide).
3. BALAKIAN, supra note 2, at 88.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Peter Balakian, Introduction to BALAKIAN, supra note 2, at xvii.
11. See Gilbert, supra note 2, at 17.
12. 60 Minutes: Turkey and Armenia's Battle over History, CBSNEWS.COM (Feb. 28, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/02/26/60minutes/main6246574.shtml%3CBR%3E. In the
desert region of Deir Zor, for example, roughly 450,000 corpses lay in a mass graveyard just a
finger's scratch beneath the surface of the sand. Id.
13. See H.R. Res. 596, 106th Cong. § 2(1) (2000); see also TANER AK(AM, A SHAMEFUL ACT:
THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND THE QUESTION OF TURKISH RESPONSIBILITY 5-6 (2006). For a list
of websites on the Armenian Genocide, see THE GENOCIDE EDUC. PROJECT, ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
ONLINE RESOURCES FOR TEACHERS, http://www.teachgenocide.org/files/GenEdWebSiteList.pdf
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campaign intended to exterminate the Armenian race.14 However, Turkey,
to this day, denies that such a campaign ever occurred.'"
A half-continent away and less than a decade later, in parts of Europe
under German control, the Nazis methodically murdered and enslaved an
estimated six million Jewish people.' 6  Concurrently, the Nazis looted art
from across Europe on an unparalleled scale, creating the "greatest
displacement of art in human history."17  When the Nazis invaded the
Netherlands, Jacques Goudstikker, along with a number of other Jewish
people, abandoned his belongings and fled for safety.' 8  En route,
(last visited February. 13, 2011).
14. See, e.g., AKQAM, supra note 13, at 7 ("Taken in their entirety, these [international archival
sources] leave us in no doubt that the scale of the operations would have been impossible without
planning at the political center."). For example, in 1915, the Great Powers-England, France, and
Russia-issued a joint declaration in regards to the Armenian Genocide: "In view of these crimes of
Turkey against humanity and civilization, the Allied governments announce publicly to the Sublime
Porte that they will hold personally responsible [for] these crimes all members of the Ottoman
government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres." Id. at 2. This promise,
however, went unfulfilled because there were no institutions in place to try foreign government
leaders, and international law did not recognize crimes committed by a state against its own people.
Id. at 2-3. In fact, if another nation were to criticize the treatment of the Armenians, this "would
have constituted intervention in the domestic affairs of the other state, which was deemed to be a
violation of international law." Thomas Buergenthal, International Law and the Holocaust, in
HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY 20 (Michael J.
Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 2006).
15. See 60 Minutes: Turkey and Armenia's Battle over History, supra note 12. Turkey does not
deny that Armenians were killed, only that there was no preconceived plan to eliminate the
Armenian people. Id. The distinction is important because the UN defines genocide as the "intent to
destroy" a racial, ethnic, or religious group. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.TS. 277. If there was no intent, then there was no
Armenian Genocide. See id. As of March 2010, more than twenty countries recognize the
Armenian Genocide, including Argentina, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Russia, Sweden, and
Uruguay. See Q&A: Armenian Genocide Dispute, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/
6045182.stm (last updated Mar. 5, 2010); Turkey Protests Sweden Armenia 'Genocide' Vote, BBC
NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8563483.stm (last updated Mar. 11, 2010). The United
States, United Kingdom, and Israel use different terminology to describe the Armenian Genocide.
See Q&A: Armenian Genocide Dispute, supra.
16. Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States Courts,
34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 6 n.4 (2000).
17. Lawrence M. Kaye, Avoidance and Resolution of Cultural Heritage Disputes: Recovery of
Art Looted During the Holocaust, 14 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISp. RESOL. 243, 243 (2006). The
amount of artwork stolen was approximately one-fifth of all Western art in existence. Id. at 244.
Further, the value of the art at that time was about $2.5 billion ($20.5 billion currently), exceeding
the value of all the artwork in the United States in 1954. Id; see also HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST
MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD'S GREATEST WORKS OF ART 23 (1997)
("In twelve years ... as many works of art were displaced, transported, and stolen as during the
entire Thirty Years War or all the Napoleonic Wars.").
18. Benjamin Genocchio, Seized, Reclaimed and Now on View, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/27/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/27brucect.html. In total, seventy-
three percent of Dutch Jews were killed by the Nazis. Id.
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Goudstikker broke his neck and died when he fell into the cargo hold of the
boat taking him and his family to England.19 Groudstikker, then the most
prominent art dealer in the Netherlands, left behind over a thousand pieces
of art, many of which were never properly restituted to his heirs. 20 Among
these pieces included a 500 year old diptych oil painting by Lucas Cranach
the Elder, a German Renaissance painter, entitled "Adam and Eve" (the
Cranachs). 2 1 The Cranachs are currently on display at the Norton Simon
Museum in Pasadena.22
The California legislature sought to assist the victims and heirs of both
the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust to obtain restitution by
extending the statute of limitations for their time-barred claims.23 The
California legislature found that many of the victims of the Armenian
Genocide and their heirs residing within the state had been intentionally
denied the benefits to their life insurance claims by their insurers.24 In
response, California enacted section 354.4 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure, which extended the statute of limitations until 2010 for these
victims and their heirs to bring suit against insurers for unpaid life insurance
claims.25 Based upon section 354.4, Father Vazken Movsesian, Pastor of the
St. Peter Armenian Church in Glendale, California, brought a class-action
lawsuit against German insurers Victoria Versicherung AG and Ergo
Versicherungsgruppe, as well as their parent company, Mftnchener
19. Id.
20. Id. After the war, only about 400 pieces were returned to the Dutch government. Id. Mrs.
Goudstikker attempted to have these paintings returned to her, but the Dutch government claimed
they legally belonged to the Dutch people. Id. Mrs. Goudstikker was able to buy back more than a
hundred, but the rest were either distributed to Dutch museums or sold to private parties. Id. In
2006, Dutch law had changed, and Mrs. Marie von Saher, Goudstikker's daughter-in-law, sued for
recovery of the paintings. Id. After years of legal battles, the Dutch government agreed to return
200 old master paintings to von Saher. Id.
21. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 578 F.3d 1016, 1020-21 (9th Cir.
2009). A "diptych" is a "picture or series of pictures (as an altarpiece) painted or carved on two
hinged tablets." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 353 (1Ith ed. 2004).
22. Norton Simon, 578 F.3d at 1020-21; Mike Boehm, Woman Seeking Return of Looted Art
from Norton Simon Museum Loses Appeal, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/
2010/jan/16/entertainment/la-et-cranachl6-201 Ojanl6.
23. See, e.g., Movsesian v. Versicherung AG, 578 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 2009); Norton
Simon, 578 F.3d at 1020-21.
24. Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1054; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4(a)-(c) (West 2006).
Lawsuits from genocide victims have yielded a combined total of $37 million in settlements from
two firms, New York Life Insurance Co. in 2004, and AXA S.A. in 2005. See Press Release, New
York Life, Agreement Is Reached to Settle Armenian Insurance Policies from 1915 (Jan. 28, 2004),
http://www.newyorklife.com/nyl/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=3597e62fl 39d2210a2b3019d221024301cac
RCRD; AXA, Annual Report (Form 20-F), at 153 (June 6, 2007); Harry Weinstein, Insurer Settles
Armenian Genocide Suit, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2004, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jan/29/locall
me-genocide29 (New York Life Insurance Co. agreed to pay $20 million to settle a lawsuit filed by
heirs of Armenian genocide victims who accused the company of failing to honor valid claims).
25. CIv. PROC. § 354.4.
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Riickversicherungs-Gesellschaft.26 Likewise, California Code of Civil
Procedure section 354.3 extended the statute of limitations until 2010 for
victims of the Jewish Holocaust and their heirs to bring claims against
museums to recover artwork stolen by the Nazis.27 Marei Von Saher,
Groudstikker's daughter-in-law and only surviving heir, sued the Norton
Simon Museum in Pasadena, California under section 354.3 for recovery of
the Cranachs, which were then valued at $24 million.2
The Ninth Circuit decided both cases, Movsesian v. Versicherung and
Von Saher v. Norton Simon, on the same day and held that both section
354.4 and section 354.3 were preempted.29 Section 354.4, the panel held,
was in conflict with the "foreign policy preference" of the Executive Branch
against using the words "Armenian Genocide."30 The panel based this
decision on an expansive reading of American Insurance Ass'n v.
Garamendi and its progeny.3' Section 354.3 was invalidated on the grounds
that California encroached on the federal authority to make and resolve
war. 32 This decision was based upon a "relic of the cold war," the dormant
foreign affairs power, a doctrine similar to the dormant Commerce Clause
but used by the Supreme Court only once in 1968.33
The purpose of this Comment is to determine whether states in the
twenty-first century have the power to enact laws which encourage and
empower their citizens to press their rights. Part 11 of this Comment will
summarize the methods by which a state law can be preempted when it
affects foreign affairs.34 Part III traces the historical development of the
26. Carol J. Williams, Federal Appeals Court Rejects Armenian Genocide Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
21, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/21/local/me-armenian-suit21; Vazken Movsesian,
Genocide Decision-08/21/09, FR VAZKEN'S BLOG (Aug. 22, 2009), http://www.mychurch.org/
frvazken/blog?PID=2.
27. CIV. PROC. § 354.3; Norton Simon, 578 F.3d. at 1020. Section 354.3 had two sister statutes,
section 354.5 (extending statute of limitations for insurance policy claims by Holocaust victims or
their heirs until 2010) and section 354.6 (creating a cause of action and extending the statute of
limitations for slave labor claims arising out of WWII until 2010), both of which were found
unconstitutional under the foreign affairs doctrine. See Steinberg v. Int'l Comm'n on Holocaust Era
Ins. Claims, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 944, 953 (Ct. App. 2005) (finding section 354.5 unconstitutional);
Deustch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 716 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding section 354.6 unconstitutional).
28. Boehm, supra note 22.
29. Movsesian, 578 F.3d 1052; Norton Simon, 578 F.3d 1016.
30. Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1059; see infra notes 225-49 and accompanying text.
31. Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1059; see Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
32. Norton Simon, 578 F.3d at 1027; see infra notes 259-85 and accompanying text.
33. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 146-47 (2d ed. 1996); see also
JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER
9/11 (2005) (discussing dormant foreign affairs power generally). See also infra notes 290-308 for a
discussion of the dormant Commerce Clause.
34. See infra notes 39-73 and accompanying text.
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foreign affairs power held by the Executive Branch and determines how
states are affected when they enact regulations either within or outside their
areas of traditional competence. Part IV examines the twin Ninth Circuit
decisions, Movsesian and Norton Simon, in light of Supreme Court
precedent. 6 This Part also searches for limitations to the dormant foreign
affairs power by drawing comparisons to limitations to the dormant
Commerce Clause proposed by several Supreme Court justices. Part V
considers the impact of Movsesian and Norton Simon, as they stand, on
federalism and separation of powers. Part VI concludes this Comment.
II. PREEMPTION UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The foreign affairs powers are the full range of international powers
exercised by a sovereign nation needed to interact with other nations." For
the United States, they are either expressed in Articles I and II of the
Constitution, or, in most instances, implied as inherent in the concept of
nationhood. 40 These powers are generally wielded entirely by the federal
government to the exclusion of the states because they are "necessary
concomitants of nationality."41
A. Express Preemption
The principle of preemption is found in Article VI of the Constitution,
which makes the federal Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties "the
supreme Law of the Land." 42 State judges are "bound" to apply federal law,
regardless of "Laws of any State to the Contrary."43 In domestic cases, if a
power is not obviously delegated to the national government, concurrent
jurisdiction will be presumed." In the realm of foreign affairs, however,
35. See infra notes 74-224 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 225-338 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 339-57 and accompanying text.
38. See infra note 358 and accompanying text.
39. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.1 (7th ed. 2004).
40. See id.; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
41. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318; see Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413-14
(2003); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941).
42. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (treaties are the supreme
law of the land).
43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. To ensure that federal authority is enforced, Article III entrusts
"judicial Power" over all cases "arising under" federal law to the U.S. Supreme Court. U.S. CONsT.
art. III, § 2.
44. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
1617, 1642 (1997) ("[T]he most natural inference [from the text of the Constitution] is that all
foreign relations matters not excluded by Article I, Section 10 fall within the concurrent power of the
state and federal governments until preempted by federal statute or treaty."); THE FEDERALIST NO.
32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("State Governments would clearly
retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had and which were not ... exclusively
760
[Vol. 38: 755, 2011] Beyond the Executive Agreement
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
this presumption may be reversed "because of the federal government's
naturally predominant role."45
A "central purpose" of the Founders was to give the federal government
the authority necessary to displace inconsistent state law, especially in the
realm of foreign affairs.46 Under the Articles of Confederation, it was nearly
impossible for the Congress of the Confederation to establish "a coherent
national foreign policy" because the states had the independent power to
implement contradictory state policy.47  As a result, the Founders
incorporated the Supremacy Clause into the Constitution to ensure that
treaties had merit.48
delegated to the United States.").
45. Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi
and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 825, 846-47 (citing Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-68 (1941)).
46. D. A. Jeremy Telman, Medellin and Originalism, 68 MD. L. REV. 377, 415 (2009) ("The
Supremacy Clause embodied the Framers' response to the more general problem of enforcing
federal law. The Framers adopted the more radical language of the New Jersey plan [Small-State
plan], declaring treaties to be 'the supreme Law of the Land,' rather than giving Congress the power
to 'negative' state legislation as proposed in the rival Virginia Plan [Large-State plan], thus
incorporating U.S. treaties into domestic law with no requirement for congressional
implementation.").
47. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 843 ("The inclusion of treaties, as well as statutes, in
the Supremacy Clause shows the extent to which the Constitution's framers focused upon state
interferences in foreign affairs under the Articles."); see also id at 843 n.64 ("Madison had wanted
the Constitution to give Congress a 'negative' over state legislation that it believed contrary to 'the
articles of Union or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union.' His proposal
encountered opposition on various grounds; the Supremacy Clause was the resulting compromise."
(citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 27-29 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)));
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 44, at 279 (James Madison) (the power to make treaties is
"disembarrassed by the plan of the Convention of an exception, under which treaties might be
substantially frustrated by regulations of the States").
48. See Telman, supra note 46, at 414 ("The purpose of the Supremacy Clause was to prevent
U.S. treaty violations 'by empowering the courts to enforce treaties at the behest of affected
individuals without awaiting authorization from state or federal legislatures."'); Ben Geslison,
Treaties, Execution, and Originalism in Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008), 32 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 767, 776 (2009) ("It is critical to understand that the Supremacy Clause is a federalism
clause and not a separation-of-powers clause. In other words, the Supremacy Clause deals with the
relationship between federal and state enactments, not with the relationship between different types
of federal enactments, and the limitations on each.").
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B. Implied Preemption Under the Modern Approach
The modem approach recognizes implied preemption-preemption that
is outside "the Supremacy Clause's plain language."49 Implied preemption
comes in two forms: field preemption and conflict preemption.o The
threshold inquiry to determine which form of preemption to apply is whether
the state is acting within an area of "traditional competence." 5  If it is, the
state law must conflict with federal law in order to be displaced. 52 If the
area is not traditionally regulated by the states, then the state regulation can
be excluded outright.13
The leading case on the subject of implied foreign affairs authority is
United States v. Curtiss-Wright.54  Justice Sutherland, writing for the
majority, held that it was within the federal government's authority to place
an embargo on the sale of arms to the warring nations of Bolivia and
Paraguay, even though the Constitution did not explicitly grant this power.5
The Court reasoned that the limitations imposed by the Constitution-that
the federal government could only exercise those powers explicitly
enumerated and those implied powers necessary and proper to effectuate the
enumerated powers-were a condition upon which the colonies granted
sovereignty to the United States. 56 This grant of power, however, did not
apply to the foreign affairs powers because the colonies, "severally[,] never
possessed" them.57  When the colonies dissolved their political bands with
49. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 844; see Emily Chiang, Think Locally, Act Globally?
Dormant Federal Common Law Preemption of State and Local Activities Affecting Foreign Affairs,
53 SYRACUSE L. REv. 923, 932-64 (2003) (discussing arguments for and against preemption).
50. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419 n.11 (2003).
51. Id. (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 459 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
52. Id. (citing Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 459 (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941) (registration of alien residents is not a field reserved to the federal
government); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (assuming that "the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress").
53. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11 (citing Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 459 (Harlan, J., dissenting));
see, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 115 (2000) (regulation of oil tanker ships is a field
reserved to the federal government); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-05 (1988)
(displacing state tort law imposing liability on government contractors for design defects in military
equipment).
54. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
55. Id. at 311-13, 333. Congress, through a joint resolution, authorized President Franklin D.
Roosevelt to place this embargo if he found that doing so "may contribute to the reestablishment of
peace between those countries." Id at 311-12. In this situation, as President Roosevelt acted
"pursuant to an express ... authorization of Congress, his authority [was] at its maximum, for it
includeld] all that he possesse[d] in his own right plus all that Congress [could] delegate. In th[is]
circumstance[], . . . may he be said ... to personify the federal sovereignty." See Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
56. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315.
57. Id at 316. For example, the Supreme Court has long held that the federal government
possesses "[t]he power to acquire territory by discovery and occupation, the power to expel
undesirable aliens, [and] the power to make such international agreements as do not constitute
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Great Britain, the "powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown"
to the colonies collectively, not individually. Therefore, the limitations
imposed by the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers "to the States ...
or to the people" did not apply to the foreign affairs powers because they
were never theirs to begin with.
Curtiss- Wright is not without its critics. 60 The problem with the
Curtiss- Wright approach is its non-textual, sweeping language. This proves
problematic for states because, even if there is a limit on this implied federal
foreign policy authority, it is not concrete and thus subject entirely to the
Court's discretion. As a result, states have considerably less leeway to enact
treaties in the constitutional sense." Id at 318 (citations omitted). These powers, however, cannot
be found "in the provisions of the Constitution, but in the law of nations" and are "inherently
inseparable from the conception of nationality." Id.
58. Id at 316.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315-18. "[T]he investment of the
federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative
grants of the Constitution." Id at 318; see, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (the
Tenth Amendment does not limit the federal government from using the treaty power to override a
state law or policy); Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144
U. PA. L. REv. 1245, 1296-97 (1996) ("The constitutional structure strongly suggests that the states
conferred all rights of external sovereignty on the federal government and retained none for
themselves. Unlike power over domestic matters, power over foreign affairs cannot be shared
without substantially impairing its effective exercise."); Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and
Federal Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 939, 940-41 (1995) ("State and local governments
have no constitutional power to regulate foreign affairs. It is not merely that such power is
specifically denied to them by the Constitution; they would be impotent even without such
proscriptions."); Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union Reconsidered: A Historical Refutation
of State Sovereignty over Seabeds, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1056, 1060-68 (1974) (arguing that Justice
Sutherland's "historical analysis of the inherent foreign affairs powers of the national government
would not have seemed alien to the thinking of many, if not all, of the Founding Fathers").
60. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION'S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 17 (2007)
("[T]he Tenth Amendment . . . appears categorically to deny the idea of inherent national powers.
By its language, powers of government fall into only two categories, reserved and delegated.
Powers not delegated by the Constitution are reserved. Delegated powers are national powers;
reserved powers are state powers, or powers of the people. There is no third category."); see also
James Wilson Speech in the State House Yard, Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167-68 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (Speech in
the State House Yard, Oct. 6, 1787) ("[E]verything which is not given, is reserved."); David M.
Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE
L.J. 467, 493-94 (1946) ("[The Curtiss-Wright decision was] the most extreme interpretation of the
powers of the national government. It is the furthest departure from the theory that [the] United
States is a constitutionally limited democracy."); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corporation: A Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (1973) ("If good history
is a requisite to good constitutional law, then Curtiss-Wright ought to be relegated to history.");
Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REv. 259, 323-24 (2009)
("Sutherland's description of the President's foreign affairs power tracks almost precisely
Blackstone's description of the royal prerogative of the King.. .. A poorer candidate for plenary
presidential power could hardly be found.").
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legislation to provide for their own citizenry where the legislation has some
international effect.
1. Conflict Preemption
If the state is regulating a traditional state responsibility, preemption
requires "a conflict, of a clarity or substantiality that would vary with the ...
importance of the state concern asserted."6  Under conflict preemption, a
state law is void when it is impossible to "comply with both state and federal
law" simultaneously, 62 or when the state law interposes an obstacle to the
achievement of the federal activity. In this scenario, "it would be
reasonable to consider the strength of the state interest, judged by standards
of traditional practice, when deciding how serious a conflict must be shown
before declaring the state law preempted."" In the absence of a conflict,
field preemption analysis would be appropriate.65
2. Field Preemption
When states act outside of their traditional areas of competence, their
laws can be preempted without a need to show conflict. 66 Essentially, a state
law can be displaced if the federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to
"occupy the field" such that Congress left no room for the states to
supplement the regulation.6 ' Even in the absence of any federal activity,
however, if a specific power is vested in the federal government, by negative
implication, states are excluded.68 For example, Article I, Section 8 gives
Congress the authority "[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
61. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419 n.11 (2003) ("Where . . . a State has acted
within . . . its 'traditional competence,' but in a way that affects foreign relations, it might make
good sense to require a conflict, of a clarity or substantiality that would vary with the strength or the
traditional importance of the state concern asserted." (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432
(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
62. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). See infra note 214 for a
discussion of Crosby.
63. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (state regulation of
occupational safety and health issues where a federal standard was already in effect conflicted with
full purposes and objectives of federal act).
64. Garamendi, 539 U.S at 420.
65. Id at 419 n.11.
66. Id. ("If a State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious
claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility, field preemption might be the appropriate
doctrine, whether the National Government had acted and, if it had, without reference to the degree
of any conflict, the principle having been established that the Constitution entrusts foreign policy
exclusively to the National Government.").
67. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372; Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.
68. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 849; see also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,
432 (1968).
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States." 69 Therefore, states are excluded from "enacting certain regulations
affecting interstate commerce even absent federal action."70 Under Article I,
Section 10, states are specifically excluded from entering "into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation," and they are not allowed to "enter into any
Agreement or Compact with ... a foreign Power" without the consent of
Congress.7 ' Therefore, the argument goes, states are also generally excluded
from enacting regulation that affects foreign affairs.72
In summation, state laws are generally excluded when they come into
conflict with federal law, or, even in the absence of a conflict, when the state
law infringes upon the federal government's exclusive power to regulate the
field of foreign affairs. It should be noted, however, that conflict and field
preemption are not "rigidly distinct" categories and that courts will
occasionally use one approach while calling it another.
III. THE PRESIDENT AS THE SYMBOL OF SOVEREIGNTY ABROAD
In terms of domestic law, the powers of the federal government are
generally divided so that the policies of the United States are created by the
laws of Congress, and the President executes those laws. 4 However, in the
69. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
70. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 849. See infra notes 290-318 and accompanying text
for a discussion on the dormant Commerce Clause.
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
72. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 849; see also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324, 331 (1937) ("[Iln respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear."); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (stating that the federal government, "representing as it does the
collective interests of the . . . states, is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct
of affairs with foreign sovereignties.").
73. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 n.6 (2000) (quoting English v.
General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Because a
variety of state laws and regulations may conflict with a federal statute, whether because a private
party cannot comply with both sets of provisions or because the objectives of the federal statute are
frustrated, 'field pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption."' Id at 372
n.6 (quoting English, 496 U.S. at 79-80 n.5); accord Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861
(2000) (using conflict preemption in place of field preemption); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v.
Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1179 (E.D. Cal. 2007) ("Thus, foreign policy preemption, whether
expressed in terms of conflict or field preemption should be understood as a species of conflict
preemption."); Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers,
State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2215 (2003) (stating that this
area of vague federalism construed by the Supreme Court is termed "implied conflict preemption").
74. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589
(1952) ("The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both
good and bad times."). However, the meaning of "executive Power" is subject to debate. See
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
47-48 (1994) (Article II, Section I "says who has the executive power; not what that power is").
The "prefatory" argument states that the "executive Power" lacked substantive meaning in the
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realm of foreign affairs, this power is divided differently because most of the
foreign affairs powers are vested in the President."
The powers of the Executive Branch are articulated in Article II, Section
2.76 The President is commander-in-chief and has the power to make
treaties (with the advice and consent of the Senate) and to appoint
ambassadors. These enumerated powers, on their face, reasonably cannot
be the full spectrum of powers required to participate in the international
arena. 8  Therefore, by necessity, there must be additional powers that are
implicit in the concept of nationhood. 7 9  These powers, then, are rightfully
held by the "sole organ" of foreign affairs: the President.so Essentially, the
eighteenth century, and instead referred generally to the powers exercised by a chief magistrate. See
RAMSEY, supra note 60, at 122. However, Professor Ramsey argues that the more natural reading is
that "at minimum Section I grants ('vests') power to enforce the laws ('executive power'), and
Sections 2 and 3 clarify specific instances of that power or add additional powers and duties not
obviously encompassed by it." Id. at 125.
75. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) ("[Iln foreign affairs the President
has a degree of independent authority to act."). This statement, of course, relies upon the assumption
that the "executive Power" includes a foreign affairs power. See I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 47, at 65 (at the Convention, drafter Roger Sherman said that "the
Executive magistracy is nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into
effect"); see also RAMSEY, supra note 60, at 125-26 ("Almost all the evidence [regarding
'executive' foreign affairs power] is indirect: comments that the President would have (some)
foreign affairs powers, comments that (some) foreign affairs powers such as treatymaking were
called 'executive.' The direct associations of executive power and foreign affairs power belong
mostly to the post-ratification period, when perhaps those who spoke had institutional reasons for
doing so."). Furthermore, there is an argument to be made that the specific powers granted by
Article II, Sections 2 and 3 relate to foreign affairs, and thus make redundant a general grant of
foreign affairs authority in Section 1. See id. However, one "cannot overcome [the] historical
evidence" that, even though the founding-era Americans may have disagreed over the precise
definition of "executive Power," the writings they studied and their own discussion demonstrate that
they generally associated "executive Power" with foreign affairs powers. Id. at 126.
76. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also Reinstein, supra note 60, at 263-71 (arguing that the
"massive transfer" of power from the executive branch to the legislative branch under Articles I and
II was a response to the use of the royal prerogatives to establish dominance over Parliament). See
generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 67-77, supra note 44 (Alexander Hamilton).
77. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
78. See supra note 57 for other foreign affairs powers not listed in the Constitution, but which
the Court has held are reserved to the federal government. See also Robert Ahdieh, The Fog of
Certainty, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 41, 49 (2009) [hereinafter Ahdieh, The Fog of Certainty]
("Broadly, one might plausibly see the contrast between the 'formidable list of enumerated powers
under Article I' and the 'very general language' of executive power in Article 11 to suggest a reading
of the latter as something less than a complete and exclusive statement of the parameters of
presidential power." (internal footnote omitted) (quoting Craig Green, Repressing Erie's Myth, 96
CAL. L. REV. 595, 657 (2008))); Clark, supra note 59, at 1296 (noting that the federal foreign affairs
powers go beyond the enumerated powers). Professor Sloss argues that this constitutional design
may have more to do with the national security concerns than anything else, namely keeping the
United States out of France's ongoing wars with England and Spain. See David Sloss, Judicial
Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 145, 146-48 (2008).
79. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-18 (1936).
80. Id. at 319. This "sole organ" language, which originated in Curtiss-Wright, is the single
greatest justification for an expansive approach to executive foreign affairs power. See RAMSEY,
supra note 60, at 14 ("Not surprisingly, the case is favored by Presidents and presidential advocates,
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President's foreign affairs powers are implied from the aggregate of his
enumerated powers.
A. Evaluating the President's Independent Authority to Act: The
Youngstown Framework
The scope of the Chief Executive's independent authority to act is
assessed in the Steel Seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.81 In 1952, the United States was struggling to end the Korean
conflict, then in its third year.82 Concurrently, a number of major steel mills
were on the verge of striking as wage negotiations between the United Steel
Workers and the mills were deadlocked.83 President Harry S. Truman,
fearful that a stoppage of steel production for any length of time would
undermine the national defense and be detrimental to the efforts in South
who see it as authority for independent presidential action in foreign affairs without the need for
explicit constitutional justification .... "); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY
OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS 23 (2002) (Curtiss-Wright is "a mainstay in the executive-branch lawyer's
kit"); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990) ("Among government attorneys, Justice Sutherland's lavish
description of the president's powers is so often quoted that it has come to be known as the 'Curtiss-
Wright, so I'm right' cite . . . ."); see also Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 369 (2005)
("In our system of government, the Executive is 'the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations,' and has ample authority and competence to manage 'the relations
between the foreign state and its own citizens' and to avoid 'embarass[ing] its neighbor[s]."'
(citations omitted)); Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414 ("Although the source of the President's power to
act in foreign affairs does not enjoy any textual detail, the historical gloss on the 'executive Power'
vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the President's 'vast share of responsibility for
the conduct of our foreign relations."' (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (quoting Napoleon, Justice Jackson wrote, "[t]he tools belong to the man who can use
them"); THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 44, at 434-35 (John Jay) (the Executive Branch has
inherent advantages over the Legislative Branch in the area of foreign affairs because of its ability to
act quickly and, if need be, in secret). But see Reinstein, supra note 60, at 298 ("Although the
President is given three elements of the foreign affairs power related to diplomacy ... , Article II
does not state that the President holds a general power over foreign affairs. It does not, for example,
incorporate Blackstone's language that the chief executive is the 'delegate or representative' of the
nation in conducting foreign affairs, or that his action is that 'of the whole nation."'). In the
alternative, Professor Ramsey suggests that the textual basis for the President's foreign affairs power
may be the Article 11, Section 1 "executive power." See RAMSEY, supra note 60, at 51-73. Though
the word "executive" is associated with law enforcement in modern times, it may have been
associated with foreign affairs powers in the eighteenth-century. See supra note 75 for a discussion
on the term "executive."
81. Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579.
82. Id. at 582-83.
83. Id at 583.
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Korea, issued Executive Order 10340 to take possession of and operate the
mills.M
Justice Hugo Black's majority opinion disagreed with the government's
argument that this seizure was within the President's "inherent power ...
supported by the Constitution, by historical precedent, and by court
decisions."" Justice Black wrote that the President's authority to issue the
executive order "must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself."86  As Congress did not "expressly authorize[]" the
President to seize the mills by way of statute, the Court evaluated whether
this authority was found in the Constitution itself.87  The Court rejected the
United States' argument that this "power should be implied from the
aggregate" of the President's constitutional powers, particularly the Article
II provision that he "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," on
the grounds that power to take private property is not a military authority
and, more importantly, that the President is not a lawmaker.8
Justice Robert H. Jackson's renowned concurrence,89 often used by
84. Id. at 584; Exec. Order No. 10340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952), reprinted in Youngstown, 343
U.S. at 673-76 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) ("The Secretary of Commerce is hereby authorized and
directed to take possession of all or such of the plants, facilities, and other property of the companies
named in the list attached hereto, or any part thereof, as he may deem necessary in the interests of
national defense; and to operate or to arrange for the operation thereof and to do all things necessary
for, or incidental to, such operation. . . ."). President Truman announced his intentions to the nation
during a national radio address while concurrently signing the executive order. See MAEVA
MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 80-84
(1977).
85. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 584 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id. at 585. Contrast this view with Justice Sutherland's view in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), discussed supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
87. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585-87.
88. Id. at 587-88 ("The Constitution limits [the President's] functions in the lawmaking process
to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the
Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to
execute." (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
89. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S 491, 524 (2008) ("Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite
scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action . . . ."); Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) ("[W]e have in the past found and do today find Justice Jackson's
classification of executive actions into three general categories analytically useful . . . ."). In total,
five Justices, including Justice Jackson, wrote separate, concurring opinions. The others were
Justices Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas, Harold H. Burton, and Thomas C. Clark (concurring
in judgment). See Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 373, 406-21 (2002). These opinions range from formalistic (Justice Black) to relatively
functional (Justice Jackson). See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1523, 1527-28 & nn.55, 59 (1997) (labeling Justice Black's majority opinion
as formalistic and Justice Jackson's as functionalist); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The
Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679, 691 & n.28 (1991) (describing Justice Black's opinion as
being an "exaggerated" and "stark" example of formalism). But see Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 215, 217 (2002) (arguing that Justice Black's
opinion is compatible with Justice Jackson's concurrence). The difference between "formalism" and
"functionalism" is that "formalism" requires that each branch of government can only act based
upon a "firm textual basis in the Constitution," whereas "functionalism" allows each branch to share
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courts and scholars to assess the powers of the Executive Branch, divided
these powers into three categories and ranked them in descending order
based upon the degree of congressional involvement:
(1) When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate ... 90
(2) When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution
is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if
not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility ... . 91
(3) When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only
by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. 92
authority as long as they do not "interfere[] with one of the core functions of another" branch. See
Brown, supra, at 1523, 1527.
90. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("In these circumstances, and in
these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act
is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government as
an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of
Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial
interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it."); see
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (executive order prohibiting
travel to Cuba was within presidential authority because Congress delegated its authority to the
Executive Branch under Passport Act of 1926 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952).
91. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("In this area, any actual test of power
is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law."); see Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531 ("[Ilf pervasive enough, a history of
congressional acquiescence can be treated as a 'gloss on "Executive Power" vested in the President
by § I of Art. II.'" (quoting Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686)).
92. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Presidential claim to a power at
once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the
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Justice Jackson determined that the authority of the President to seize
"strike-bound industries" could only be defended under the third category,
and only if doing so was "within his domain and beyond control by
Congress."9  He ultimately concluded that it was not.
B. Executive Agreements
Although the Executive Branch cannot make domestic law, this does not
limit the President's authority to establish foreign policy.95 The general rule
is that, in order for a state law to be displaced, the Constitution requires that
it must come into conflict-expressly or impliedly-with a "supreme law,"
namely the Constitution, a federal law, or a treaty. 96 However, the Court has
carved out an exception to the Treaty Clause and has generally held that
conflicts with executive foreign policy, embodied in an executive agreement,
receive the same result as those state laws in conflict with a valid treaty.
An executive agreement is an international compact between the
President, acting independently of Congress, and a foreign government or
nationals.98  Like a treaty, executive agreements bind the United States. 99
equilibrium established by our constitutional system."); see Michael J. Turner, Fade to Black: The
Formalization of Jackson's Youngstown Taxonomy by Hamdan and Medellin, 58 AM. U. L. REV.
665, 669 (2009) (arguing that Hamdan establishes Congress's "disabling" power in the third
category); Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief and the Separation of Powers
after Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933, 960-61 (2007) (arguing that the
majority opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006), "skipped a few steps" by
assuming that Congress automatically wins in the third category).
93. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Ahdieh, The Fog of
Certainty, supra note 78, at 49 ("Congress constrains presidential power all the time, in ways that go
well beyond the text of Article II. Justice Jackson's tripartite scheme . . . might even be read to
endorse as much, with its recognition that presidential authority expands and contracts in ways
beyond the bare outline of executive power offered in Article II, as Congress variously acts and fails
to act." (citation omitted)).
94. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring).
95. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413-14 (2003) ("There is, of course, no
question that at some point an exercise of state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to
the National Government's policy . .. . Nor is there any question generally that there is executive
authority to decide what that policy should be." (emphasis added)).
96. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
97. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 429. "To paraphrase the Medellin majority, some treaties
delegate power to the president and some do not, depending on the treaty." Carlos Manuel VAzquez,
Less than Zero?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 563, 567 (2008) [hereinafter Vdzquez, Less than Zero?] (citing
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 519-21 (2008)); see also Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole
Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REv. 1573, 1578-80 (2007) ("[Iln resolving cases involving sole
executive agreements, courts need only decide whether such agreements qualify as 'the supreme
Law of the Land' under the Supremacy Clause.").
98. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 530-31; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to
Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1787 (2009) [hereinafter Paulsen, Constitutional
Power]. There are two types of executive agreements: "[1] congressional-executive agreements,
which require participation by both houses of Congress; and [2] sole executive agreements, in which
the President unilaterally reaches an agreement with another nation in areas of his plenary executive
authority." John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive
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However, unlike a treaty, which is only effective when ratified by "two
thirds of the Senators present,"'00 an executive agreement requires only that
the President and the head of the other government sign the document. fo
Otherwise, the difference between a treaty and an executive agreement in the
realm of foreign affairs is unclear.102
This power has been criticized because of its inconsistencies with a
textual reading of the Constitution. 0 3  For example, why would the
Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 765 (2001); see also HENKIN, supra note 33, at 215 ("[T]here
are agreements which the President can make on his sole authority and others which he can make
only with the consent of the Senate, . . . but neither Justice Sutherland nor anyone else has told us
which are which."). When the term "executive agreement" is used in this Comment, it will be in
reference to the latter.
99. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Paulsen, Constitutional Power, supra note 98, at 1787 ("An
executive agreement is an international compact, or deal, made by the President alone, without the
two-thirds majority Senate consent required for Article II treaty formation."). However, some
presidents, like Theodore Roosevelt, considered them binding only on the administration which
signed them. Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J.
664, 679 (1944) [hereinafter Borchard, Executive Agreement].
100. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
101. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 4.6.2 (3d ed.
2006).
102. Id ("[E]xecutive agreements can be used for any purpose; that is, anything that can be done
by treaty can be done by executive agreement."); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past,
Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1238
(2008) (noting that the United States makes binding international agreements through two separate
processes, one of which is laid out in the Constitution and one that is not); Myres S. McDougal &
Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable
Instruments of National Policy (pts. I & II), 54 YALE L.J. 181, 534 (1945) (supportive); JONATHAN
D. VARAT, WILLIAM COHEN & VIKRAM D. AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
408 (13th ed. 2009). But see Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54
YALE L.J. 616 (1945) (critical); Yoo, supra note 98, at 765 (sole executive agreements "are not
considered to be interchangeable with treaties"). "Although there is no Supreme Court holding on
point, it appears, then, that a federal statute would prevail if it were in conflict with an executive
agreement." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 101, § 4.6.2 n.21 (citing United States v. Guy W. Capps,
Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affidon other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955)).
103. See Borchard, Executive Agreement, supra note 99, at 677-78 (criticizing executive
agreements as (1) "permit[ting] the President to involve the country in secret agreements," (2) being
"of uncertain duration," (3) "may be terminated unilaterally by any future President at any time," (4)
"unsafe for the United States or any foreign country" because "they can be congressionally
disapproved at any time," (5) not having "the constitutional dignity and force of a treaty, since the
Constitution makes no mention of them, but specifically mentions treaties," and (6) "their conscious
use as a substitute for treaties gives rise to the charge of constitutional 'evasion'); Michael D.
Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non) Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133, 219 (1998)
(arguing that the justifications for the executive agreement points strongly against giving them the
force of law); David Sloss, International Agreements and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1963, 1964-75 (2003) ("There is a strong case for judicially enforced federalism
limitations on sole executive agreements because the process for concluding sole executive
agreements provides very weak political safeguards for the states."); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The
Dangers of Deference: International Claim Settlement by the President, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 4
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Constitution explicitly state that treaties are a supreme law of the land, yet
remain silent about executive agreements, which purportedly have just as
much preemptive weight, yet are more easily attained because they do not
require Senate approval?'" Nevertheless, the Court has permitted them in
large part because they have been in use, without dispute from Congress,
since the Adams Administration. 05  As a result, the Court has never held
one to be unconstitutional because it lacked Senate approval.' 06
(2003) [hereinafter Wuerth, Dangers of Deference] ("Sole executive agreements terminating
domestic litigation stand in significant tension with the Treaty and Supremacy Clauses.").
104. The "federalist position" argues that, because these "other agreements" are not specifically
mentioned in the Supremacy Clause, they cannot have preemptive effect. Anne E. Nelson, From
Muddled to Medellin: A Legal History of Sole Executive Agreements, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1035, 1038-
39 (2009). For example, in Article 1, Section 10, Clause 3, the Constitution specifically excludes
states from entering into "any Agreement or Compact with . . . a foreign Power" without Congress's
consent. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. "The Framers knew that countries entered into agreements
other than treaties. Yet the President's power to enter into executive agreements with foreign
countries is not enumerated in Article II, nor is this power specifically given to Congress."
Reinstein, supra note 60, at 298; see Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L.
REv. 741 (2010). The "nationalist position," by contrast, takes a broader stance and holds that the
President has implied powers necessary to carry out the enumerated powers, including the power to
enter into executive agreements. See Sloss, supra note 103, at 1967-68; THE FEDERALIST No. 64,
supra note 44, at 436 (John Jay) ("[C]onstitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the
judicial department, have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceed from the
Legislature . . . .").
105. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 n.8 (1981). During the first fifty years of
U.S. history, Presidents entered into only twenty-seven executive agreements. CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION:
ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOc. NO. 108-
17, at 516 (2002), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/pdf2002/012.pdf. The first
executive agreement was entered into in 1799 between President John Adams and the Dutch
Government to resolve all claims concerning the cargo of an American schooner that was seized by a
Dutch Privateer and taken to the island of St. Martin. 5 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1079, 1099 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931-1937). In the past
fifty years, the use of executive agreements has multiplied to almost 15,000. Nelson, supra note
104, at 1040 (providing a thorough history of the use of the sole executive agreement).
106. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 101, § 4.6.2. Congress considered eliminating executive
agreements in a few instances, however, these efforts proved to be unsuccessful. S.J. Res. 1, 83d
Cong., Ist Sess., 99 CONG. REC. 6777 (1953); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 39, at 251;
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 101, at 361. In the 1950s, Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio and his
supporters campaigned to overturn dicta made by Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416, 433 (1920), which stated that "Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when
made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the
authority of the United States." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 39, at 251 n. 17. Concerned that
this statement could be interpreted by courts to mean that treaties were not subject to the same
constitutional limitations as acts of Congress, Senator Bricker proposed an amendment, the Bricker
Amendment, which "would have provided that a treaty could become effective as internal law only
through legislation that would be valid in the absence of a treaty." Id. at 251; see Arthur E.
Sutherland, The Bricker Amendment, Executive Agreements, and Imported Potatoes, 67 HARV. L.
REv. 281, 281-83 (1953). Eventually, the Bricker Amendment was defeated by Congress, and the
movement waned, partly because the concerns surrounding it were alleviated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Reidv. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957), where the Court ruled that the Constitution
was supreme over international treaties ratified by the United States Senate. See HENKIN, supra note
33, at 146-47; Bert B. Lockwood, The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights
772
[Vol. 38: 755, 2011] Beyond the Executive Agreement
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
1. The Litvinov Agreement: Belmont & Pink
The extent to which the President can use executive agreements to
unilaterally act was first raised in United States v. Belmont'0 7 and United
States v. Pink.08 In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt entered into an
executive agreement, the Litvinov Agreement, with the Soviet Union.' 09
After the Russian Revolution, the soviets nationalized a number of Russian
corporations and appropriated their assets,"o including money deposited by
a metal works company with a New York City private banking firm"' and
by an insurance company with the New York Superintendent of
Insurance.11 2  In exchange for recognition of this newly formed Soviet
Government by the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
assigned all of its claims against Americans for those assets deposited in the
United States to the Federal government."' In both cases, New York courts
refused to enforce this assignment by the Litvinov Agreement, holding that
they were contrary to New York policy against the confiscation of
property.114
The Supreme Court upheld the agreement even though it was not a
formal treaty approved by the Senate."' In Belmont, the Court declared that
"no state policy can prevail against the international compact here
involved."ll 6  Justice William Douglas reiterated this opinion in Pink,
concluding that even though the executive agreement did not require
approval by the Senate, it had "a similar dignity" as a treaty, and thus had
Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L. REv. 901 (1984). Recently, this movement has seen a slight
resurgence. Professor Randy Barnett, in association with the Nationwide Tea Party Coalition, has
proposed a similar amendment to the Constitution, the fourth of ten proposed amendments, called
the Bill of Federalism. See Randy Barnett, Resolution for Congress to Convene a Convention to
Propose Amendments Constituting a Bill of Federalism, FORBES.COM (May 20, 2009), http://www.
forbes.com/2009/05/20/bill-of-federalism-constitution-states-supreme-court-opinions-contributors-
randy-barnett_2.html ("No treaty or other international agreement may enlarge the legislative power
of Congress granted by this Constitution, nor govern except by legislation any activity that is
confined within the United States.").
107. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
108. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
109. Pink, 315 U.S. at 211-13; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 326.
110. Pink, 315 U.S. at 211-13; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 326-27.
111. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 325-26.
112. Pink, 315 U.S. at 213.
113. Id. at 211-13; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 326-27. The United States acquired these assets to
provide a method of settling claims that various Americans claimants had against the Soviet
government. Id at 326-27.
114. Pink, 315 U.S. at 211; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 327.
115. See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331-32.
116. Id. at 327.
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the same preemptive effect over state law and policy."' Furthermore, "[t]he
powers of the President in the conduct of foreign relations include[] the
power, without consent of the Senate, to determine the public policy of the
United States with respect to the Russian nationalization decrees."" 8
Therefore, the President, as the "'sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations,"' certainly had the "modest implied power"
to settle such claims." 9
2. The Algiers Accords: Dames & Moore
Almost forty years later, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,120 the Court
again upheld the preemptive effect of an executive agreement entered into
between President Jimmy Carter and Iran.12' On November 4, 1979, the
American Embassy in Tehran was seized by Iranian revolutionaries and
many American diplomatic personnel were taken hostage.122 In exchange
for the release of these hostages by Iran, the United States agreed to: (1)
nullify the attachments and liens on Iranian assets in the United States and
order the transfer of these assets to Iran; and (2) terminate all legal claims
made by American nationals against Iran, requiring that they instead be
presented to an independent claims tribunal for binding arbitration.123
Dames & Moore, Inc., a civil engineering corporation with a claim pending
against Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Iranian banks for
breach of contract worth almost $3.5 million, argued that the agreement was
beyond the executive's authority.124
In a unanimous opinion penned by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court relied heavily upon Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown to
hold that the executive agreement was constitutional.125  In regards to
117. Pink, 315 U.S. at 230; see also Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330 ("That the negotiations, acceptance
of the assignment and agreements and understandings in respect thereof were within the competence
of the President may not be doubted.... Governmental power over external affairs is not
distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government. And in respect of what was done
here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that government. The assignment and
the agreements in connection therewith did not, as in the case of treaties, as that term is used in the
treaty making clause of the Constitution (Article II, § 2), require the advice and consent of the
Senate.").
118. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229.
119. Id (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)); see also
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 n.14 (2003) ("[T]he President possesses
considerable independent constitutional authority to act on behalf of the United States on
international issues, and conflict with the exercise of that authority is a comparably good reason to
find preemption of state law." (citations omitted)).
120. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
121. Id. at 663.
122. Id at 662.
123. Id. at 662-66.
124. Id at 663-64, 666-69.
125. Id. at 674 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
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whether the President had the authority to nullify the attachments on Iranian
assets and direct the transfer of these assets to Iran, the Court concluded that,
as Congress enacted the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA),12 6 President Carter's actions fell within the first category of the
Youngstown scheme because he was acting "pursuant to specific
congressional authorization."1 27  Therefore, they were 'supported by the
strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation,
and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack
it."' 1 2 8 To hold otherwise "would mean that the Federal Government as a
whole lacked the power exercised by the President, and that we are not
prepared to say."1 29
In regards to the second question, whether the President had the
authority to terminate American legal claims against Iran, the Court found
that President Carter was acting within the second category, the "'zone of
twilight,"' in the Youngstown framework.130  Because Congress granted the
President general authority to act during times of emergency through the
IEEPA and Hostage Act,13 ' Congress had a "history of acquiescence in
executive claims settlement[s]," thus giving the President implicit authority
to implement the claim settlement by way of an executive agreement. 32
Justice Rehnquist was careful to note the narrowness of the Court's
(Jackson, J., concurring)). In this regard, the Court was cautious not to use the "sole organ"
reasoning from Belmont and Pink and instead used Justice Jackson's taxonomy for the first time.
See Thomas A. O'Donnell, Illumination or Elimination of the "Zone of Twilight"?: Congressional
Acquiescence and Presidential Authority in Foreign Affairs, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 95, 99 (1982)
(stating that the Supreme Court had "ignored" Justice Jackson's tripartite scheme until Dames &
Moore); Mark D. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown: Against the View that Jackson's Concurrence
Resolves the Relation Between Congress and the Commander-in-Chief 54 UCLA L. REV. 1703,
1711 n.22 (2007) (arguing that Dames & Moore did not undermine Justice Jackson's reasoning).
126. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (2006). The President was authorized to "nullify, void, prevent or
prohibit . . . any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any
property, subject to thejurisdiction of the United States." Id.
127. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675.
128. Id. at 674 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 668 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637).
131. 22 U.S.C. § 1732. The President was authorized to "demand the release" of a U.S. citizen
who "ha[d] been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign
government.... [I]f the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall
use such means, not amounting to acts of war and not otherwise prohibited by law, as he may think
necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release . . . ." Id.
132. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686. But see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1165 (2008) (stating that the Court did not show previous
instances of "presidential suspension of pending lawsuits").
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holding, stating that "[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power, but
'long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would
raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its
consent .... Essentially, this ruling "seemed to confirm the need to
read Pink and Belmont narrowly."l 34  Thus, the proper standard for
determining the validity of executive agreements is not the "sole organ"
language employed by Belmont and Pink, but the Youngstown tripartite
framework.135 The greater implication of this holding is that when analyzing
the second "zone of twilight" category of Youngstown, any congressional
action or inaction may be deemed as approval of the presidential action. 136
3. The German Foundation Agreement: Garamendi
In Garamendi,137 a 5-4 majority held that a state statute in "clear
conflict" with the express Executive Branch policy goals would also be
preempted. 38  For decades after World War II, the proceeds of many life
insurance policies held by victims of the Holocaust remained unsettled
because European insurers refused to recognize Holocaust-era policies,
claiming they had either lapsed or that their documentation had been
destroyed.' 39  In the late 1990s, class-action lawsuits initiated by Holocaust
survivors and their heirs against European insurers "poured into United
States courts."140 In response, President Clinton and German Chancellor
133. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,
474 (1915)).
134. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 860.
135. Nelson, supra note 104, at 1050.
136. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons
from the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1310-11 (1988); see O'Donnell, supra note 125, at
111 (arguing that Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Youngstown was used by the Court in Dames
& Moore to define Justice Jackson's "zone of twilight"). Other scholars have criticized Dames &
Moore for betraying the very purpose of the Youngstown taxonomy by muddling the categories by
"allowing congressional opposition . . . to be interpreted as congressional silence; or allowing
congressional silence ... to be interpreted as congressional approval." Patricia L. Bellia, Executive
Power in Youngstown's Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 145 (2002).
137. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
138. Id. at 425.
139. Id at 401-03. Many of these European insurers were not as "fully forthcoming" as to the
identities of unsettled policyholders as they claimed to be. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at
833.
140. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 405; see also Burt Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of
Holocaust-Era Litigation in American Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795, 796 n.2, 813-14 (2002)
(providing a chronological list of major decisions from Holocaust-era class-action litigation between
1998 and 2002). The reason for this flood of Holocaust related litigation was that, after World War
II, the western Allies, who were responsible for reparations, deferred restitution because they feared
that if the new Federal Republic of Germany was economically weak, it would not be able to
withstand the expansion of the Soviet Union. Id. at 403; see also Forced Transfers of Property in
Enemy-Controlled Territory, Jan. 5, 1943, 3 Bevans 754 (granting to Allied Forces the right to
invalidate wartime transfers of property); REPORT OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR THE
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Schroder signed the German Foundation Agreement in 2002,141 which
established a voluntary foundation to serve as a forum for claims against
German companies operating during the Nazi regime. 142  The Foundation
Agreement also stated that, whenever a Holocaust restitution suit was
brought against a German company in the United States, the Federal
Government would file a statement with the court stating that the case
should be dismissed on any valid legal ground because foreign policy
interests of the United States favor the Foundation as the exclusive forum
and remedy for these claims.143  Further, the Federal Government would
"use its 'best efforts' . . . to get state and local governments to respect the
foundation as the exclusive mechanism" because "'the United States does
not suggest that its policy interests concerning the Foundation in themselves
provide an independent legal basis for dismissal.'""
Meanwhile, the California legislature enacted the Holocaust Victim
Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA).14 5 The purpose of HVIRA was to
PROTECTION AND SALVAGE OF ARTISTIC AND HISTORIC MONUMENTS IN WAR AREAS, (June 30,
1946) (providing procedures in regards to looted artwork found within the United States zone of
occupation); Seymour J. Rubin, The Washington Accord Ffity Years Later: Neutrality, Morality, and
the International Law, 14 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 61, 61-66 (1998). The reunification of East and
West Germany on October 3, 1990, signaled the end of this moratorium on reparations. See
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 405. In 1998, several of these European insurers, along with Holocaust
survivor organizations, the State of Israel, and the U.S. National Association of Insurers, created the
International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC), to serve as a vehicle to
settle unpaid claims out of court. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 406-07. The ICHEIC, however, is an
independent claims administrator and is not supervised by any governmental agency or court order.
ICHEIC, Holocaust Era Insurance Claims Processing Guide 1, 8 (June 22, 2003), http://icheic.org/
pdflICHEICCPG.pdf.
141. Agreement Concerning the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future," U.S.-
Ger., July 17, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1298 (2000) [hereinafter Foundation Agreement]. Similar agreements
were entered into with Austria and France. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 408.
142. See Foundation Agreement, supra note 141, at 1298; Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 405-06.
143. See Foundation Agreement, supra note 141, at 1303; Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 406-07. The
Foundation would work with the ICHEIC to negotiate the settlement of these claims with European
insurers. See Foundation Agreement, supra note 141, at 1303; Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 406-07.
144. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 406, 436 (quoting Foundation Agreement, supra note 141, at 1304).
In this regard, Garamendi is outside of Article VI preemption precedent because there was no
express congressional delegation of authority to the President. See id. at 429. The rationale behind
prior cases like Crosby was that, since the President was acting under the authority of Congress, his
authority was therefore at a "maximum." See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,
381 (2000). Unlike previous cases, the Garamendi Court argued that a lack of affirmative
congressional disapproval of the President's policy gave the President complete freedom to act. See
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 429.
145. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13800-07 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009). In addition, California passed a
series of measures extending the statute of limitations on Holocaust-era insurance claims. Von
Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Arts, 578 F.3d 1016 (2009); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.5(b)-
(c) (West 2004).
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enable the roughly 5,600 documented Holocaust survivors residing in
California to seek restitution for unpaid life insurance claims by providing a
disclosure mechanism whereby insurers doing business within the state
would be required to make public the names of all holders of such policies
sold by the company itself, or any "related" entity,146 in Europe between
1920 and 1945.14' Noncompliance with HVIRA would result in a
suspension of the insurance company's license and possibly lead to criminal
sanctions. 148
Justice Souter, writing for the majority in Garamendi, began with the
proposition that, when a state law "touches on foreign relations," it can be
displaced if that law is in conflict with a federal foreign policy.149 Next, the
President has the independent "authority to decide what that policy should
be" by entering into executive agreements with foreign governments.' 5
Here, however, because there was "no preemption clause" in the executive
agreement, the issue was whether similar preemptive effect could be
decrypted through inference.'' Justice Souter, relying upon Justice
146. A "related" company, according to HVIRA, included "any parent, subsidiary, reinsurer,
successor in interest, managing general agent, or affiliate company of the insurer," even if the
companies were not "related during the time when the policies subject to disclosure were sold."
HVIRA § 13802(b).
147. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 408-10; HVIRA § 13803-04(a). Essentially, HVIRA sought to
overcome the difficulty that Holocaust survivors and their heirs were having in settling insurance
claims because European insurers were simply not releasing their records on which claims remained
unfulfilled. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 410; supra note 139 and accompanying text.
148. See HVIRA § 13806; Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 410.
149. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413 ("There is, of course, no question that at some point an exercise
of state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National Government's policy,
given the 'concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign nations' that animated the
Constitution's allocation of the foreign relations power to the National Government in the first
place." (citations omitted)). But see infra note 255 for a district court's interpretation of the policies
at issue in Garamendi, Crosby, and Zschernig.
150. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414-15. This power to settle claims with foreign governments, the
Court argued, naturally extended to settlements of claims with foreign corporations because
"untangling govemment policy from private initiative during wartime is often so hard" that a
prohibition against settling private claims would impair the President's diplomatic objectives. Id. at
416.
151. Id. at 417. Not only was there no preemption clause, but the Foundation Agreement itself
disclaimed any preemptive influence. See Foundation Agreement, supra note 141, at 1304; supra
text accompanying note 144. Though the Court's initial premise may be correct, see supra note 149,
the idea that preemptive effect could be accomplished by inference not only expands the power of
the Executive Branch to preempt a valid state law without going through the normal constitutional
channels, but also makes the judiciary the arbiter of that very policy; this is a role that the
Constitution simply does not assign to judges. Professor Paulsen, in regards to Justice Souter's
"inference," wrote:
Garamendi does this absurdity one better, finding that there need not be an "executive
agreement" at all, but merely an executive branch policy or practice, or mere discussions
or negotiations involving foreign nations. Not only could the existence of an executive
agreement preempt state law, but the nonexistence of an executive agreement apparently
could do so too.
Paulsen, Constitutional Power, supra note 98, at 1790.
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Harlan's minority opinion in Zschernig v. Miller,52 concluded in the
affirmative.'13
Where a state law has more than an "incidental effect" on express
federal foreign policy, Justice Souter reasoned, the first question is whether
the state is acting "within 'areas of.. . traditional competence."'l54 If not,
then field preemption applies.'55 If so, then conflict preemption applies, and
"it would be reasonable to consider the strength of the state interest, judged
by standards of traditional practice, when deciding how serious a conflict
must be shown before declaring the state law preempted." 56
Justice Souter concluded that restitution of "victims injured by acts and
omissions of enemy corporations in wartime is thus within the traditional
subject matter of foreign policy," and not an area traditionally regulated by
the states.'15  Therefore, California's attempt to use "an iron fist" was in
''clear conflict" with the express presidential policy of merely using "kid
gloves,"' thus "'compromis[ing] the very capacity of the President to
speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments' to
resolve claims against European companies arising out of World War I."'"
This "national position," which gave "express endorsement" to voluntary
settlement through the ICHEIC, was "expressed unmistakably" in the
executive agreements signed by President Clinton and reiterated by high-
level members of the Executive Branch. 160
In her passionate dissent, Justice Ginsberg disagreed with the majority's
assessment that there was a clear conflict between the state and federal
foreign policy largely because of the "absence of express preemption." 6'
152. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). See infra notes 201-19 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Zschernig.
153. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 417-20. Note, in Zschernig, unlike Garamendi, the executive
branch policy did not conflict with Oregon's statute; the Oregon statute was preempted "as a matter
of constitutional exclusion, not statutory preemption." Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 878;
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 436; see also Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 330
(1994).
154. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420 (quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 459 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(omission in original)).
155. Seeid. at 420 n.11.
156. Id. at 420.
157. Id. at 420-21. Justice Souter also argued that the state interest in providing restitution for
about 5,600 documented Holocaust survivors living in California was outweighed by the same
interest for roughly 100,000 survivors nationwide. Id. at 420, 426.
158. See id. at 421, 427.
159. Id. at 424 (emphasis added) (quoting Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,
381 (2000)).
160. Seeid at421-22, 423 n.13.
161. Id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 442 ("[W]e have never premised foreign
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Justice Ginsberg was troubled with the particular emphasis placed upon
evidence of Executive Branch foreign policy, namely the letters written by
Under Secretary of State Stuart E. Eizenstat to the insurance commissioner
of California and to California Governor Gray Davis expressing his concern
that California's efforts would undermine the ICHEIC.162 Justice Ginsburg,
stated that she "would not venture down that path." 63  In addition,
Professors Denning and Ramsey criticized the lack of limiting language
employed by the Court in previous decisions like Dames & Moore.,6
Arguably, this language was later supplied by the Court in Medellin v.
Texas.165
4. The Bush Memorandum: Medellin v. Texas
In 1993, Jos6 Ernesto Medellin and several other gang members
viciously raped and murdered two teenage girls in Austin, Texas. 66
Medellin was arrested five days later and confessed within a few hours.167
He was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death, a conviction
which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. 6 1
Medellin filed for state habeas relief based on a claim that, because he
told the arresting officer that he was born in Mexico, Texas violated his
rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) because
affairs preemption on statements of that order. ... We should not do so here lest we place the
considerable power of foreign affairs preemption in the hands of individual sub-Cabinet members of
the Executive Branch." (citation omitted)).
162. See id at 411-12 (majority opinion).
163. Id at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
164. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 869 ("Garamendi furnishes an excellent example of
'doctrine creep,' whereby entirely new principles of law are justified on the basis of prior cases,
while ignoring important facts or limiting language that were important-perhaps decisive-in the
previous cases."); see also Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151,
1184 (E.D. Cal. 2007) ("So far as this court can discem, Garamendi's holding that the California law
is preempted represents the high-water mark in the reach of the doctrine of foreign policy
preemption."). See infra notes 285-86 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of "doctrine
creep."
165. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). One should note that two justices that were part of the majority in
Garamendi were no longer serving when Medellin was decided. Paulsen, Constiutional Power,
supra note 98, at 1795 ("First, Judge John Roberts had become Chief Justice, replacing Chief Justice
William Rehnquist. Second, Judge Samuel Alito had become an Associate Justice, replacing Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor."); see also Ingrid Wuerth, Medellin: The New, New Formalism?, 13 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 1, 5-6, & n.30 (2009) ("Justice Kennedy is the only Justice who joined the
majority opinions in both Garamendi and Medellin."). Since Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor's departure, the Court has made a few other "recent decisions adverse to the President's
position in the high-profile cases of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, [542 U.S. 507 (2004)], and Rasul v. Bush,
[542 U.S. 466 (2004)] . . . ." Paulsen, Constitutional Power, supra note 98, at 1793.
166. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 500-01.
167. Id
168. Id.
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Texas failed to notify the Mexican consulate of his arrest.'69  The Texas
court denied the writ, finding that Medellin was procedurally barred from
raising this claim because he failed to do so at his criminal trial.170 While
Medellin's application for a certificate of appealability was being considered
by the Fifth Circuit, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in a fourteen-to-
one decision, held that the United States violated Article 36(1)(b) of the
VCCR.' 7 1 Specifically, the ICJ directed the United States to "review and
reconsider[]" the conviction and sentencing to determine whether the
violation prejudiced Medellin, irrespective of any procedural default for
failure to raise the Vienna Convention claim in a timely fashion.172
The Fifth Circuit denied Medellin's appeal,' 73 and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.174 Before the Court could hear oral arguments, President
George W. Bush issued a memorandum to the Attorney General providing
"that the United States [would] discharge its international obligations" by
requiring that state courts "give effect" to the ICJ decision.'75 The Supreme
Court dismissed the case to allow the Texas state court to determine whether
Medellin should be granted the "review and reconsideration he requested" in
light of the Bush Memorandum.' 76 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
however, dismissed Medellin's second application for habeas relief as abuse
of the writ and held that the Bush Memorandum and the ICJ judgment could
not displace Texas's procedural default rules. 77  The Supreme Court again
169. Id. at 501-02. In 1969, with Senate approval, the United States ratified the VCCR and the
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention
(Optional Protocol). Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(l)(b), Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. Under Article 36(1)(b), whenever foreign nationals are arrested, the
host country has three working days to notify the foreign national of their right to alert their
consulate. Id. By ratifying the Optional Protocol, the United States also consented to the specific
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for all "disputes arising out of the
interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention." Id. at 100; Medellin, 552 U.S. at 499-502
& n.1.
170. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 500-01.
171. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 1.C.J. 12, 53-55 (Mar. 31).
172. Id.; see also Medellin, 552 U.S. at 502-03. Though the means by which the ICJ decision was
to be implemented was left to the discretion of the United States, "such review was required without
regard to state default rules." Id. at 503.
173. The Fifth Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S.
371, 375 (1998), which held that a Paraguayan citizen was procedurally barred from raising VCCR
claims, despite a contrary ICJ decision. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 503.
174. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 503.
175. Id. (quoting George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General, Alberto R. Gonzales
(Feb. 28, 2005), reprinted in Telman, supra note 46, at 379 n. 4); see also Vizquez, Less than Zero?,
supra note 97, at 565.
176. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 503.
177. Id at 504.
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granted Medellin's petition for certiorari. 78
Among the issues before the Court was whether President Bush could
implement the Avena decision as binding domestic law by requiring state
courts to comply with the ICJ decision.17 9  Though the Bush Memorandum
was not an executive agreement, the Court nevertheless considered the
validity of the President's actions based upon the jurisprudence of the
executive agreement contemplated by Garamendi and its progeny and
concluded that the Bush Memorandum did not have preemptive effect over
the Texas procedural bar to successive habeas petitions.'80 President Bush
could not, the Court found, unilaterally convert a non-self-executing treaty,
made by the President and consented to by the Senate, into a self-executing
one.' 8 ' Here, the Court took what some scholars consider a formalistic
approach by emphasizing the Constitution's specific treaty-making
procedures.182 The Court held that, as the President's efforts were in direct
conflict with the "implicit understanding" of the Senate, his actions fell
within the third category of Justice Jackson's Youngstown tripartite
framework and, therefore, he could not unilaterally bypass these
procedures. 183
178. Id
179. Id. at 523. Though beyond the scope of this Comment, the bulk of Medellin addressed the
issue of whether the ICJ opinion was binding on domestic law. Id. at 506-31. The Court ultimately
held that the treaty on which Medellin's claim was based was non-self-executing, and thus not
binding on domestic law. Id. at 506. This decision, the most important one on the subject since
United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833), was the first time the Court denied relief
solely on the ground that the treaty was non-self-executing. Compare Carlos Manuel Vizquez,
Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122
HARV. L. REV. 599, 600 (2008) (arguing that the Supremacy Clause establishes a default rule that
treaties are self-executing and directly enforceable in the courts like other laws, rebuttable only by a
clear statement that the obligations imposed by the treaty are subject to legislative implementation),
with David H. Moore, Law(makers) of the Land: The Doctrine of Treaty Non-Self-Execution, 122
HARV. L. REv. F. 32, 32 (2009) (arguing that "a treaty may itself, by means short of a clear
stipulation that the treaty requires legislative implementation, indicate that it is domestically
unenforceable"). Note, the Court did not dispute that "the ICJ's judgment in Avena create[d] an
international law obligation on the part of the United States," but to secure this obligation required
joint action by the President and Congress. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 522.
180. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 532. This outcome was surprising to some scholars, see Paulsen,
Constitutional Power, supra note 98, at 1795 ("A betting man might well have predicted that the
Supreme Court would reverse the Texas courts on the basis of Garamendi."), and was a "welcome
change from Garamendi." Wuerth, Dangers ofDeference, supra note 103, at 5-6.
181. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 530.
182. Wuerth, Dangers of Deference, supra note 103, at 1. See supra note 89 for a discussion on
the differences between formalism and functionalism.
183. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 527. This reliance upon Youngstown was criticized by Professor
Wuerth as being misplaced because Youngstown was "a case about constitutional review of
executive actions," whereas this portion of Medellin deals with "the claim that 'the relevant treaties
... give the President the authority to implement [the Avena judgment]."' See Wuerth, Dangers of
Deference, supra note 103, at 6. Professor Wuerth also questioned the "expansive application" of
Justice Jackson's third category, especially since this was "only the first time a majority of the Court
has explicitly categorized an action of the President" in such a manner. Id. After the publication of
Professor Wuerth's article, the Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006),
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Alternatively, the United States and Medellin argued that the Bush
Memorandum was issued pursuant to the executive authority to resolve
disputes with foreign nations.184 The Court also rejected this argument and,
in so doing, Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly emphasized that the executive
agreement exception was a preemptive mechanism that applied only to "a
narrow set of circumstances ... to settle civil claims between American
citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals."' 85  To trigger this
independent authority, there must be a "pervasive . . . history of
congressional acquiescence" to the practice asserted by the President.'86
Unlike the claims-settlement cases,'8 1 which were "based on the view that 'a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
the Congress and never before questioned, [could] raise a presumption that
the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent,"' President Bush's
memorandum was an "'unprecedented action."" 88
Chief Justice Roberts also reiterated the limiting language found in
Dames & Moore that "the Court has been careful to note that '[p]ast practice
does not, by itself, create power."l 89 The effect of Medellin, however, goes
beyond this simple statement.190 In effect, Medellin narrowed the scope of
suggested that the President's actions in that case also fell within Justice Jackson's third category.
184. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 530.
185. Id. at 531-32 ("The Executive's narrow and strictly limited authority to settle international
claims disputes pursuant to an executive agreement cannot stretch so far as to support the [Bush]
Memorandum.").
186. Id. at 531.
187. E.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1947); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937).
188. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531-32 (quoting Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686).
189. Id. (quoting Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686).
190. With respect to Medellin personally, despite pleas to Texas Governor Rick Perry by
President Bush, Mexico, and the United Nations' Secretary General to stay the execution, the State
of Texas executed Medellin on August 5, 2008. James C. McKinley, Jr., Texas Executes Mexican
Despite Objections, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, http://nytimes.com/2008/08/06/us/06execute.html;
Mary D. Hallerman, Medellin v. Texas: The Treaties That Bind, 43 U. RICH. L. REv. 797, 813
(2009). By adhering to its own laws and refusing to be swayed by international pressure, some have
argued that Texas was better able to secure the rights and needs of its citizens. Ex Porte Medellin,
280 S.W.3d 854, 862, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (Cochran, J., concurring) ("Although we accord
the greatest respect to, and admiration for, the [ICJ] and its judgments, we, like the Supreme Court,
cannot trample on our own fundamental laws in deference to its judgment.... [I]f we cut down our
laws to suit another sovereign that operates under a different system of justice, we could not stand
upright in the lawless winds that would then blow. If we violate our state and federal procedural
rules for this particular applicant, we should violate them for all American defendants as well. And
then we would have no rules and no law at all. . .. Some societies may judge our death penalty
barbaric. Most Texans, however, consider death a just penalty in certain rare circumstances. Many
Europeans may disagree. So be it.").
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the Garamendi decision despite the fact that "Medellin was a much stronger
case ... for the invalidation of a state law."'91 The Roberts Court
"effectively stripped" the "sole organ" language from Belmont, Pink, and
Garamendi in relation to executive agreements and, by doing so,
demonstrated a higher degree of deference to the legislature by requiring that
executive agreements must either be based upon some "independent
constitutional authority or explicit congressional authorization." 92  The
Medellin decision also constricted Justice Jackson's "zone of twilight"
category by requiring that, where the President takes action without
congressional approval, but still based upon some independent constitutional
authority, that action must be a part of a "systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before
questioned." 93  By contrast, Justice Jackson's standard was more flexible
and was largely dependent on "the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables."l 94  However, despite the limitations made by Medellin in
regards to executive agreements, the Court did not address the portion of the
191. See, e.g., Reinstein, supra note 60, at 333. Medellin was a stronger case for preemption
because "(1) the state law was in direct (not indirect) conflict with (2) a treaty obligation (as opposed
to an executive agreement), and (3) the President instructed Texas to comply with the treaty
obligation." Id.; see also Geslison, supra note 48, at 783 ("The originalists [on the Court] were in
fact more disciplined in determining original understanding than advocates of presumed self-
execution because a presumption of non-self-execution preserves constitutionally mandated
separation of powers while not undermining the primacy of federal law."); Paulsen, Constitutional
Power, supra note 98, at 1798 ("The Supreme Court rightly rejected that argument, and in so doing
may have started down the road away from the unsound reasoning of Dames & Moore and
Garamendi."); Wuerth, Dangers of Deference, supra note 103, at 2 ("[T]he Medellin opinion reads
in places like a breath of formalist fresh air, emphasizing both the importance of the Constitution's
specific law-making procedures in the context of treaties and a text-based interpretation of treaties
aimed to vest control over foreign relations with the political branches, not the courts." (citations
omitted)). Some scholars, however, argue Medellin did not go far enough. Professor Paulsen wrote
that Chief Justice Robert's opinion "consign[s] [the claims-settlement cases] to a small corner,"
distinguishing Garamendi, Dames & Moore, Pink, and Belmont, without quite overruling them.
Paulsen, Constitutional Power, supra note 98, at 1799 n.98. By not overturning the claims-
settlement cases, the danger remains that a future Court might show less judicial restraint and revive
these cases. See id. ("[I]n principle the constitutional rule that the President cannot alone make
domestic law cannot be so narrowly and strictly limited, and this suggests that the Dames & Moore-
Garamendi power should not merely be thought 'strictly limited' but should be repudiated
entirely."); Vizquez, Less than Zero?, supra note 97, at 564 ("[T]he majority's analysis of the
president's memorandum in Medellin tells us little about the president's power to displace state law
to promote foreign policy interests unrelated to non-self-executing treaties. (The majority itself
disclaimed broad implications for its presidential power holding by inserting a this-day-and-train-
only footnote reminiscent of its similar disclaimer in Bush v. Gore, [531 U.S. 98 (2000)].)").
192. Nelson, supra note 104, at 1062-63.
193. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531. It is arguable that the Court in Medellin, by requiring a pervasive
history of congressional acquiescence to enable the President to act, either severely restricted this
category beyond the flexible standard contemplated by Justice Jackson or eliminated it outright by
extending the first category to eclipse the zone of twilight. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 104, at 1039
(arguing that Medellin restricted the second category); Turner, supra note 92, at 669 (arguing that
Medellin eliminated the second category).
194. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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Garamendi decision relying upon the doctrine of the dormant foreign affairs
power.
C. The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power
In the area of foreign policy, the role of the federal government is said to
be so pervasive that, even in the absence of a federal regulatory scheme,
state action is precluded.19 5 The Constitution specifically forbids states from
"enter[ing] into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation," or "grant[ing]
Letters of Marque and Reprisal." 96  Without congressional consent, states
are further excluded from "lay[ing] any Imposts or Duties on Imports or
Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its
inspection Laws" or "keep[ing] Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace,
enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact ... with a foreign Power, or
engage[ing] in War," unless imminent danger requires otherwise.197 Further,
"all Treaties made, or which shall be made" are the "supreme Law of the
Land."' 9 8  According to the Supreme Court, this text, taken in light of the
overall structure and history of the Constitution, along with the Framers'
very understanding of the concept of nationhood, implies that states are
forbidden from encroaching on foreign affairs.199 The rationale behind this
195. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S.
72, 79 (1990); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-
64 (1941); see also Clark, supra note 59, at 1295 ("Exclusive federal authority over the conduct of
foreign affairs is well established. The Constitution contains no single clause vesting exclusive
authority over this area in the federal government. But the sum of its parts, considered in light of the
constitutional structure, leaves little doubt in this regard."); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations
Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223, 1228-29 (1999) ("The constitutional architecture itself
evinces a norm of federal exclusivity in foreign affairs, on the one hand granting expansive foreign
relations power to the federal government, on the other hand denying them to the states.....
[A]gainst the landscape of foreign relations as they were conducted at the time of the Founding, the
allocation seems decisively to have established a principle of federal exclusivity. War, trade,
treaties, and the maintenance of diplomatic relations-arguably the foreign relations of the Founding
era consisted of nothing else."). But see Goldsmith, supra note 44 (arguing that the federal common
law of foreign relations as currently practiced by courts and understood by scholars lacks
justification).
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
197. Id. cl. 2-3.
198. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
199. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Constitutionality of State and
Local "Sanctions" Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State, States' Affairs, or A Sorry State of
Affairs?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307, 317-24 (1999) (describing origins of the dormant foreign
affairs power); HENKIN, supra note 33, at 162 ("Until 1968 there was no hint of such a principle [as
the dormant foreign affairs power]."), 40-42 ("[B]y constitutional exegesis, by inferences and
extrapolations small and large . . . Presidents have achieved and legitimated an undisputed,
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doctrine is the need for the federal government to be able to speak with "one
voice" when addressing foreign nations.2 00
This reasoning is manifest in the holding of Zschernig v. Miller,20 '
which established the dormant foreign affairs power. In 1968, when Cold
War anxiety was at its apex, an Oregon resident died intestate, and his sole
heirs, residents of East Germany, sought to inherit his estate.202 Under
Oregon law, however, nonresident aliens were prohibited from inheriting
property without first demonstrating that, among other things, an American
heir had a reciprocal right of inheritance without confiscation. 203  The East
extensive, predominant. . . 'foreign affairs power,' though ... its scope and content remain less than
certain."); Goldsmith, supra note 44, at 1641-42 (arguing that the dormant foreign affairs power is a
federal common law doctrine and not supported by the text of the Constitution); RAMSEY, supra
note 60, at 346 (arguing that the dormant foreign affairs power has little textual basis in the
Constitution, except perhaps in regards to the presidential powers). The rationale behind "dormant"
powers generally is that, when the Constitution grants power to one entity, by negative implication it
limits the power of another entity. See id. at 273; THE FEDERALIST No. 32, supra note 44, at 200
(Alexander Hamilton) (the Constitution should be read to deny power to the states "where it granted
an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally
contradictory and repugnant"). For example, expressly granting Congress the power "to declare
War" (art. I, § 8) "implicitly limits the President's executive war power" (art. II, § 1) and excludes
the President from being able to declare war. Id. In regards to federalism, an explicit grant of
authority to the federal government may, by negative implication, prohibit the states from exercising
that power. Id. The most famous example of this power is the dormant Commerce Clause. See
infra notes 290-308 and accompanying text for further discussion on this doctrine. A "negative
implication" should be contrasted with what Hamilton called a "negative pregnant," whereby
"denying specific state powers would likely confirm state power in related areas not specifically
denied." RAMSEY, supra note 60, at 276. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 32, supra note 44
(Alexander Hamilton).
200. See Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 442 (1968); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233-
34 (1947) ("No State can rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power
over extemal affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively.
It need not be so exercised as to conform to State laws or State policies, whether they be expressed
in constitutions, statutes, or judicial decrees. And the policies of the States become wholly irrelevant
to judicial inquiry when the United States, acting within its constitutional sphere, seeks enforcement
of its foreign policy in the courts."); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) ("Our system of
government ... requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free
from local interference."); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("In respect of all
international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines
disappear. As to such purposes, the state of New York does not exist."); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 306 (1936); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) ("For local interests the several States of the Union exist,
but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one
nation, one power."); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575-76 (1840) ("It was one of the
main objects of the constitution to make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one people, and
one nation; and to cut off all communications between foreign governments, and the several stat[e]
[sic] authorities."); THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 44, at 279 (James Madison) ("If we are to
be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations."). However, this view,
according to some, has not evolved to keep pace with the modern shift away from the concept of
dual federalism in the United States. See infra note 328.
201. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
202. Id. at 430; see also Note, Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of Greenhouse
Gas Emissions, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1877, 1879 (2006).
203. Zchernig, 389 U.S. at 430-32; OR. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1957) (repealed 1969).
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German heirs challenged the Oregon state board petition, which requested
that the property be escheated to the state.20
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, saw a "persistent and subtle"
effect on international relations because the statute encouraged probate
judges to engage in the "notorious" practice of using their benches as
soapboxes to criticize "nations established on a more authoritarian basis than
our own." 205 The Court cited a number of cases which had required local
probate courts to weigh evidence submitted by foreign dignitaries, including
taking into consideration the interest these foreign governments had in
acquiring the property and "the fact that declarations of government officials
in communist-controlled countries as to the state of affairs existing within
their borders do not always comport with the actual facts."206 The "real
desiderata" of these probate decisions was the "foreign policy attitudes, the
freezing or thawing of the 'cold war,"' which "are matters for the Federal
Government, not for local probate courts." 207 The fact that "States ... have
traditionally regulated the descent and distribution of estates" 208 and that the
Justice Department filed an amicus curiae contending that the Oregon
statute does not "unduly interfere[]" with foreign policy is irrelevant. 209 A
state law that "impair[s] the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign
policy," even in the absence of a supreme law of the land, will be
excluded.210
Zschernig is controversial largely because the Court did not provide a
204. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430.
205. Id. at 440.
206. Id. at 436 (quoting State Land Bd. v. Pekarek, 378 P.2d 734, 738 (Or. 1963) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). For example, a New York probate judge stated, "If this money were
turned over to the Russian authorities, it would be used to kill our boys and innocent people in
Southeast Asia." Austin Heyman, The Nonresident Alien's Right to Succession Under the "Iron
Curtain Rule", 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 221, 234 (1957). In regards to a Soviet probate claimant, a
Pennsylvania judge said, "If you want to say that I'm prejudiced, you can, because when it comes to
Communism I'm a bigoted anti-Communist." Harold J. Berman, Soviet Heirs in American Courts,
62 COLUM. L. REv. 257, 257 (1962). Another exclaimed, "I am not going to send money to Russia
where it can go into making bullets which may one day be used against my son." Zschernig, 389
U.S. at 437 n.8.
207. Zchernig, 389 U.S. at 437-38.
208. Id. at 440.
209. Id at 434. Justice Stewart, in his concurrence, argued that "[r]esolution of so fundamental a
constitutional issue cannot vary from day to day with the shifting winds at the State Department."
Id. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 440 (majority opinion). Although not stated, Justice Douglas's opinion seems to rest
on "the logic of the federal system." Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended
Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 835 (1989); see also, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275,
279-80 (1875) (invalidating a California law which established a state Commissioner of
Immigration who could require a bond to admit supposedly undesirable Chinese immigrants).
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textual basis for this new dormant foreign affairs power.2 1' Essentially,
Justice Douglas spent a great deal of time arguing how the Oregon law
implicated foreign affairs, but he "did not say why [it] 'must give way."'212
For example, the prohibitions against the states listed in Article I would be
redundant if the Framers had intended a more general power. Other scholars
defended Zschernig as intuitively arriving at the correct result because "[iun
the tinderbox world of superpower competition, the potential consequences
of giving offense were obviously profound." 2 13  Yet, for whatever reason,
the Court has largely ignored Zschernig, only addressing it twice in dicta:
once in Crosby,214 and then again in Garamendi, which expanded upon it.215
211. Justice Harlan criticized the majority opinion for its "untenable" analysis, which "turned its
back on a cardinal principal of judicial review." Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 443-44 (Harlan, J.,
concurring); see also, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 439 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("We have not relied on Zschernig since it was decided, and I would not resurrect that
decision here."); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1184 (E.D.
Cal. 2007) (courts generally "have shown reluctance to extend Zschernig's reach further"); Cruz v.
United States, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (declining to apply Zschernig to a
California law that extended the statute of limitations for Mexican nationals participating in labor
importation programs and their heirs seeking to recover withheld wages from Mexico, Mexican
banks, the United States, and American banks); HENKIN, supra note 33, at 239 (the dormant foreign
affairs power is a "new constitutional doctrine" that "will take many years and many cases" to work
out its application); Goldsmith, supra note 44, at 1649 (noting that Professor Henkin and Hans Linde
both believe that the dormant foreign affairs power was a new constitutional doctrine); Richard B.
Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821, 830 (1989)
("[S]ome aspects of the Zschernig doctrine of 'dormant' foreign relations power are troublesome
.... ); Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 855, ("The key proposition for which it appears to
stand-and which makes it controversial-is that in the absence of a treaty provision, a law, or even
an executive branch policy, a state law may still be struck down if it has 'more than some incidental
or indirect effect in foreign countries' or carries 'great potential for disruption or embarrassment to'
the Government's conduct of foreign affairs." (footnotes omitted) (quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S. at
434-35)); Spiro, supra note 195, at 1232, 1264-66 (arguing that the dormant foreign affairs power,
along with the dormant foreign commerce power, and the inclusion of customary international law
as a part of federal common law, should be abandoned).
212. See RAMSEY, supra note 60, at 261 (quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440).
213. Spiro, supra note 195, at 1242 (explaining the federal exclusivity argument); see also Maier,
supra note 210, at 832-33; Bilder, supra note 211, at 827 ("[T]he vital national interest in the
effective and efficient achievement of U.S. foreign relations objectives requires that other nations
perceive our foreign policy as unified and coherent .... Consequently, state and local involvement
in international issues, particularly if not in accord with administration policy, may undermine the
conduct of U.S. foreign relations and the credibility of our negotiating posture by conveying the
appearance of disagreement, confusion, uncertainty and weakness in our Government's stated
foreign policy positions."); David Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality ofState and
Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 175, 204 (1997) ("[C]arrying parochial concerns to the international stage could
have repercussions well beyond the localities themselves. No harm is done when Boston's large
population of Irish politicians gathers to sing Irish songs on St. Patrick's day; there may be harm
done, however, if Boston is allowed to instigate a skirmish with the United Kingdom over Northern
Ireland in which the rest of the country is not inclined to participate."). For further discussion, and a
partial defense, see Carlos Manuel Vizquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1259, 1262-66,
1304-21 (2001) [hereinafter Vdzquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?].
214. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000) ("Because our
conclusion that the state Act conflict[ed] with federal law [was] sufficient to affirm the judgment
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In neither case did the majority of the Court apply the dormant foreign
affairs power, relying instead on conflict preemption to displace the state
laws.2 16
D. Summary of the President's Authority to Determine Foreign Policy
In sum, the analytical steps required to determine whether a state law
affecting foreign affairs should be preempted can be summarized as follows:
When a state law has more than an incidental effect on federal foreign
policy, that law can be preempted under the doctrine of implied
below, we decline to speak to field preemption as a separate issue .... ). In Crosby, the state of
Massachusetts passed a law which prohibited state entities from "doing business with Burma." Id. at
366-67. Three months later, Congress passed an act which imposed sanctions on Burma, and
authorized the President to impose further sanctions, as well as to diplomatically develop a
comprehensive strategy for bringing democracy to Burma. Id at 368-69. The Court found the
Massachusetts statute preempted by the Supremacy Clause under the theory of conflict preemption
because the "entire scheme of the statute . . . [was] an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's
full objectives" under its sanctions, id. at 373, and undermined the "intended purpose and 'natural
effect' of Congress's act. Id. at 373-74, 388. Justice Scalia concurred with the majority's verdict,
but wrote separately because he believed the majority opinion to be not only "wasteful" in terms of
length, but "harmful" to future litigants who would have to research legislative record "even when a
statute is clear on its face, and its effects clear upon the record." Id. at 391 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Critics of Zschernig praised the Court's narrow decision in Crosby. Compare Jack Goldsmith,
Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 Sup. CT. REv. 175, 215 n.152 (noting that the National
Foreign Trade Council would "help put an end to state and local efforts to make foreign policy"),
with Vdzquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, supra note 213 ("Crosby perpetuates foreign affairs
exceptionalism [and] thus offers little cause for celebration to the critics of dormant foreign affairs
doctrine.").
215. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419-20 ("It is a fair question whether respect for the executive
foreign relations power requires a categorical choice between the contrasting theories of field and
conflict preemption evident in the Zschernig opinions, but the question requires no answer here. For
even on Justice Harlan's view, the likelihood that state legislation will produce something more than
incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy of the National Government would require
preemption of the state law." (footnote omitted)). Zschernig and Garamendi, however, are
distinguishable. See id at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Under Zschernig, the structure of the
Constitution excluded the state from enacting a foreign affairs policy, irrespective of whether or not
the federal government had enacted its own contradictory policy. See Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429, 434-35 (1968). Garamendi, on the other hand, prevented the state from pursuing a domestic
policy that conflicted with the President's foreign policy of encouraging settlements. See
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420-21.
216. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374 n.8; Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419-20. As a result, some scholars
thought Zschernig was a dead doctrine. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARV. L. REv. 815, 865 (1997) ("[T]here are reasons to think that Zschernig's dormant foreign
relations preemption retains little, if any, validity."); Edward T. Swaine, The Undersea World of
Foreign Relations Federalism, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 337, 340 (2001) ("We no longer know ... whether
there is any real doctrine of dormant foreign relations preemption, or when it applies . . . .").
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preemption.2 17 To determine which type of implied preemption to apply-
field/dormant foreign affairs preemption or conflict preemption-the
threshold question that courts ask is whether the state is acting within an area
of traditional competence.218
If the state regulation is not addressing a traditional state responsibility,
then the state can be excluded outright under implied field/dormant foreign
affairs preemption because generally the federal government is solely
responsible for conducting foreign affairs.219
If, on the other hand, the state was acting within an area traditionally
regulated by the state, then there must be a "conflict, of a clarity or
substantiality" to be determined by balancing the state concern with the
federal concern.220 If this conflict comes in the form of executive branch
activity, then the President's authority must be analyzed under the tripartite
Youngstown framework.22' Whether or not the President has independent
authority to act will determine whether the President needs congressional
acquiescence, either implicitly or explicitly. 222  Under Medellin, the
President has the authority to enter into executive agreements where he has
independent authority to act under Article II and Congress has either
expressly authorized the President to act or there is a pervasive history of
congressional acquiescence.223 The settlement of civil claims between
Americans and foreign entities, for example, is an area in which Congress
has historically allowed the President to act unilaterally.224
IV. BEYOND THE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT
In 2009, the Ninth Circuit confronted the validity of two California
statutes in light of the precedent established by Garamendi and Medellin.
The first statute referenced the Armenian Genocide, despite a purported
executive branch foreign policy preference to the contrary. The other
provided Holocaust victims with a means to reclaim stolen art hanging on
California museum walls, allegedly in violation of the federal government's
dormant foreign affairs power. The panel invalidated both statutes and, in
doing so, expanded upon the precedent established by Garamendi.
217. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 844.
218. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420 (quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 459 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
219. Id at 419 n.11. Even though the Court in Garamendi referred to this as "field" preemption,
"it would apply whether or not the federal government had acted and so more closely resembles the
dormant preemption of Zschernig." See Note, supra note 202, at 1880.
220. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.l1.
221. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981).
222. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
223. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531-32.
224. See id.
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A. Movsesian and the Foreign Policy Preference
In Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG,225 the Ninth Circuit held that
an Executive Branch "foreign policy preference" could preempt a state law
in conflict with that policy. 22 6  The California legislature enacted section
354.4 to extend the statute of limitations for victims of the Armenian
Genocide and their heirs who were denied the benefits to their life insurance
policies. 227  The legislature's use of the words "Armenian Genocide"
brought the statute under the scrutiny of the Ninth Circuit.228
A majority of the Ninth Circuit, in a decision modeled after the
Garamendi decision, held that legislative recognition of the Armenian
Genocide was contrary to, and therefore preempted by, clearly expressed
executive branch foreign policy. 229  Movsesian principally relied on two
conclusions from Garamendi: first, "that 'presidential foreign policy' itself
may carry the same preemptive force as a federal statute or treaty;" and
second, this policy need not be "contained in a single executive
agreement." 230
To demonstrate this "express federal policy," the panel relied on three
abandoned congressional resolutions using the words "Armenian
Genocide." 23 1 In all three instances, the Executive Branch expressed
225. Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).
226. See id. at 1059.
227. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.4(a)-(c) (West 2006); "Section 354.4 was modeled after §§
354.5 and 354.6, which extended the statute of limitations until 2010 for Holocaust-era insurance
claims and World War II slave labor claims, respectively." Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1054. Both
sections 354.5 and 354.6 were found unconstitutional. See supra note 27.
228. See Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1054, & 1063 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). "'Armenian Genocide
victim' means any person of Armenian or other ancestry living in the Ottoman Empire during the
period of 1915 to 1923, inclusive, who died, was deported, or escaped to avoid persecution during
that period." § 354.4(a)(1).
229. Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1063.
230. Id. at 1056 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421-23 (2003)).
231. Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1057-59; H.R. Res. 106, 110th Cong. (2007) ("Calling upon the
President to ensure that the foreign policy of the United States reflects appropriate understanding and
sensitivity concerning issues related to human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide documented in
the United States record relating to the Armenian Genocide, and for other purposes."); H.R. Res.
193, 108th Cong. (2003) ("Whereas the enactment of the Genocide Convention Implementation Act
marked a principled stand by the United States against the crime of genocide and an important step
toward ensuring that the lessons of the Holocaust, the Armenian Genocide, and the genocides in
Cambodia and Rwanda, among others, will be used to help prevent future genocides."); H.R. Res.
596, 106th Cong. (2000) ("Calling upon the President to ensure that the foreign policy of the United
States reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity concerning issues related to human rights,
ethnic cleansing, and genocide documented in the United States record relating to the Armenian
Genocide, and for other purposes.").
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opposition to these resolutions.2 32  President Clinton urged the Speaker of
the House, Congressman J. Dennis Hastert of Illinois, "in the strongest terms
not to bring [House Resolution 596] to the floor." 2 33  President George W.
Bush expressed similar opposition to House Resolution 193, through a letter
sent by a member of the State Department to the Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee,234 and Resolution 106, during a press conference on the south
lawn of the White House.235 In each instance, the resolutions died in
23committee.236 By stitching together these statements as examples of
"specific action" undertaken by the Executive Branch to defeat these
measures, the panel concluded that, just as in Garamendi, an express
"foreign policy preference" could be inferred. 237  The panel dismissed the
232. Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1057-59. According to the Movsesian panel, the Executive Branch's
purpose in opposing these resolutions was to not "provoke Turkey's ire," considering that the United
States had a significant military presence in that country and an interest in the Middle East
altogether. See id. Turkey had the second largest army in NATO and, as an ally of the United
States, Turkey allowed the United States to use its airfields. 60 Minutes: Turkey and Armenia's
Battle over History, supra note 12. Seventy percent of U.S. supplies to the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan went through Turkey. Id. Finally, Turkey's opposition to recognition of the Armenian
Genocide was at least partly influenced by its interest in joining the European Union, which had
been stalled by alleged human rights violations. Id.
233. Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1057. President Clinton was "deeply concerned" that H.R. Res. 596
could negatively impact the United States' "significant interests in this troubled region of the world:
containing the threat posed by East and Central Asia, stabilizing the Balkans, and developing new
sources of energy." Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on a Resolution on
Armenian Genocide, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2225-26 (Oct. 19, 2000), available at http://www.anca.org/596-
hastert.html. Several senior-level Administration officials also sent letters. Movsesian, 578 F.3d at
1057; H.R. REP. No. 106-933, at 16-19 (2000), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong reports&docid=f:hr933.106.pdf.
234. H.R. REP. No. 108-130, at 5-6 (2003), available at http://www.congress.gov/cgi-
bin/cpquery/R?cpl08:FLD010:@l(hrl30) ("[The Administration] oppose[s] HR 193's reference to
the 'Armenian Genocide.' Were this wording adopted, it could complicate our efforts to bring peace
and stability to the Caucasus and hamper ongoing attempts to bring about Turkish-Armenian
reconciliation. We continue to believe that fostering a productive dialogue on these events is the
best way for Turkey and Armenia to build a positive and productive relationship. Declarations such
as this one, however, hinder rather than encourage that kind of dialogue. We want to work with
Turkey and Armenia to achieve our common objectives, including improving relations between the
two countries. Such declarations do nothing to help the process."). The letter was written by
Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs, Paul V. Kelly and addressed to the Chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, Jim Sensenbrenner, Jr. Id.
235. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Discusses Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act Legislation (Oct. 10, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/
archivelll/docs/bush-disc-fisal.pdf:
On another issue before Congress, I urge members to oppose the Armenian genocide
resolution now being considered by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. We all deeply
regret the tragic suffering of the Armenian people that began in 1915. This resolution is
not the right response to these historic mass killings, and its passage would do great harm
to our relations with a key ally in NATO and in the global war on terror.
Id.
236. See Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1057-59.
237. See id at 1059. But see Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 329-30
(1994) ("The Executive Branch actions-press releases, letters, and amicus briefs-on which
[defendant] here relies are merely precatory. Executive Branch communications that express federal
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argument that there was no executive agreement embodying this foreign
policy because, in Garamendi, the Foundation Agreement "did not apply to
all of the claims at issue."238 More specifically, because HVIRA (the statute
at issue in Garamendi) required only the disclosure of Holocaust-era
insurance claims, whereas the Foundation Agreement established a method
for settling those unpaid claims, this disparity between the requirements of
HVIRA and those of the Foundation Agreement "could not have been
central to the Court's finding of preemption in that case."239
Having thus established that an "express" foreign policy existed, the
panel next determined that this policy could preempt contrary state law if the
"executive authority [was] validly exercised" under the tripartite
Youngstown framework.2 40 The panel distinguished the executive authority
used in Movsesian from that of Medellin and Barclays Bank PLC v.
Franchise Tax Board of California.24 1 In Medellin, the executive foreign
policy was directed at state criminal law, an area traditionally regulated by
the states.242 Likewise, in Barclays Bank, the executive branch's policy,
expressed in a "series of Executive Branch actions, statements, and amicus
filings," which proscribed the use of a "'worldwide combined reporting"'
method to determine how much a multinational corporation doing business
in the state should pay in corporate franchise tax, was directed at foreign
commerce, "an area delegated by the Constitution to Congress." 243
policy but lack the force of law cannot render unconstitutional California's otherwise valid,
congressionally condoned, [state law].").
238. Id. ("[T]he preemptive power of the federal policy is not derived from the form of the policy,
but rather from the source of the executive branch's authority to act.").
239. Id. at 1059 (citing Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003)); see also
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 435 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
240. Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1059; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). Though not stated, this would place the President's authority in
the second category of the Youngstown scheme, the "Zone of Twilight," in which case the President
would have to "rely upon his own independent powers" to act. See Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1059;
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("In this area, any actual test of power is
likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law.").
241. Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1059; Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298
(1994). See infra notes 332-38 for further discussion of Barclays Bank.
242. Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1059; Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 527-32 (2008).
243. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 328-29; Movesesian, 578 F.3d at 1059; see also U.S. CONsT. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3. Like the Ninth Circuit, the Court in Garamendi also distinguished Barclays Bank as a
case involving the Commerce Clause and thus required congressional action. See Garamendi, 539
U.S. at 423. Regulation of the insurance industry, though arguably commercial in nature, was held
to be a political matter. Id This distinction between political and commercial may not be a
satisfactory basis for resolving future claims where the facts do not as readily support one category
over the other. See Celeste Boeri Pozo, Foreign Affairs Power Doctrine Wanted Dead or Alive:
Reconciling One Hundred Years of Preemption Cases, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 591, 604-05 n.74 (2006)
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The presidential statements in Movsesian, on the other hand,
"concem[ed] national security, a war in progress, and diplomatic relations
with a foreign nation," areas where the President has the lead role.2 44
Therefore, the Movsesian panel concluded, the President was acting within
his independent authority by "developing and enforcing the policy refusing
to provide official recognition to an 'Armenian Genocide."' 2 45  In the
alternative, the panel argued that, even if the President did not have the
independent authority to preempt state law, "Congress's documented
deference," evidenced by its failure to pass the aforementioned House
Resolutions, placed the President's authority within the first category of the
Youngstown framework and therefore empowered the President to act as he
saw fit.246
Just as in Garamendi, the panel in Movsesian concluded that, on its face,
section 354.4 was in clear conflict with this express foreign policy
preference against using the phrase "Armenian Genocide."247 Because "the
Executive Branch vehemently opposed" the language employed by failed
House Resolutions 596 and 106, and section 354.4 "closely parallel[ed]" that
language, it is logical that the president would be equally opposed to section
("However, the defendants in both Crosby and Garamendi argued that trade and insurance
regulations are commercial in nature and should be left as matters for Congress to decide. While the
Court was understandably comfortable deeming a tax regulation as a commercial matter, and
sanctions and war repayment claims as political matter, one can imagine scenarios where this line is
more difficult to draw."); Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 882 ("This distinction seems
unsatisfactory. Even if one accepts the President's 'lead role' in foreign policy, Justice Souter did
not explain why the HVIRA was not a regulation of foreign commerce. After all, California's
disclosure requirements applied to entities doing business in the state, and made compliance a
condition of continued licensing. In other words, the HVIRA set conditions under which private
companies did business in California. It is hard to see it as anything other than a commercial
regulation.").
244. Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1059; First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,
767 (1972).
245. Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1060. This conclusion leads to the following question: If the
California legislature had used a phrase other than "Armenian Genocide"-for example "massacre,"
as President Clinton had done; "annihilation," as President George W. Bush had done; or even used
the Armenian word for genocide, "Meds Yeghern," as President Obama had done-would the panel
have given the executive branch documents the same effect? Brief for Human Rights Orgs. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees and Rehearing at 15-17, Movsesian, 578 F.3d 1052
(No. 07-56722). Whether or not the purpose of the act was to recognize the "Armenian Genocide"
as occurring, its practical effect was to extend the statute of limitations on life insurance claims taken
out between 1915 and 1923, which insurers refused to fulfill. Simply striking out the offending
language should have alleviated the panel's concerns, and indeed there was a severability clause, but
the panel disagreed, stating that "[e]ven assuming subsection (c) could be separated from the
constitutional deficiencies underlying the rest of the statute, the subsection would still conflict with
the federal policy at issue." Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1060.
246. See Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1060; Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring)
("Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with
caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.").
247. Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1056-57. "By choosing to use the words 'Armenian Genocide,' §
354.4 directly contradicts the President's express foreign policy preference." Id. at 1061.
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354.4248 If section 354.4 were allowed to stand, the panel concluded,
California would undermine the diplomatic efforts of the Executive Branch
and "provoke[] Turkey's ire," leaving the nation as a whole to suffer.249
Finally, as the Court in Garamendi had done, the panel balanced
California's interest in enacting section 354.4 against the federal interest.25 0
The panel concluded that the true intent of the California legislature, its "real
desiderata," was not "a procedural rule extending the statute of limitations
and reviving previously barred claims," as it purported to do, but to
"express[] its dissatisfaction with the federal government's chosen foreign
policy path. Garamendi and Deutsch v. Turner Corp. clearly hold that this
is not a permissible state interest."251
The panel's analysis is subject to much criticism. First, regulating the
insurance industry has long been acknowledged as a traditional state
interest.252  Second, for conflict preemption to be implied, as the name
248. Id. at 1060-61 ("California has done what Congress declined to do: it has defied the
President's foreign policy preferences, and has undermined the President's diplomatic power.").
249. Id. at 1061; see Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1968). However, President Bush
did not specifically express any objection to section 354.4 when it was passed. See Brief for Human
Rights Orgs., supra note 245, at 10-11. Further, Congress itself has twice recognized the Armenian
Genocide. Pet. from Interlocutory Appeal of the U.S. Dist. Ct., Cent. Dist. of Cal. at 12 n.3,
Movsesian, 578 F.3d 1052 (No. 07-56722). As a practical matter, forty-three states have officially
acknowledged the Armenian Genocide in Official Statements or State Resolutions, or both. Pet.
from Interlocutory Appeal, supra at 8 n.2.
250. Movsesian, 578 F. 3d at 1062.
251. Id. at 1062-63; see Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 427 (2003); Deutsch v.
Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 712 (9th Cir. 2003) (invalidating a state law that extended the statute of
limitations for individuals forced into slave labor during World War II where there was an express
federal policy stemming from a series of treaties and international agreements entered into by the
United States and foreign nations to end World War II and to resolve disputes stemming from the
war). This "real desiderata" language closely parallels the language in Zschernig and Garamendi.
252. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1981);
Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1063 (Pregerson, J., dissenting); Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 434 n.1 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) ("States have broad authority to regulate the insurance industry, and a State does not
exceed that authority by assigning special significance to an insurer's treatment of claims arising out
of an era in which government and industry collaborated to rob countless Holocaust victims of their
property." (citation omitted)). In fact, Congress itself has stated as much by passing the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-12 (2006), which put an end to a dormant Commerce Clause
presumption that insurance was a matter of interstate commerce. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 451 U.S.
at 653 ("Congress removed all Commerce Clause limitations on the authority of the States to
regulate and tax the business of insurance when it passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act . . . ."); Group
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 219 n.18 (1979); State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd
Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451, 452 (1962); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S.
310, 319 (1955). Under this Act, regulation of the insurance industry is left generally to the states,
and "silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed" as disapproval of state regulation.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1011. Essentially, this Act gave states broad authority to regulate the insurance
industry, "despite its interstate character." Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 837. "Whether
California has, while acting within its authority to regulate the insurance industry, intruded upon the
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entails, there must be a conflict between a state law and the Constitution, the
laws of the United States, ratified treaties, or an executive agreement.253
Though Garamendi relied upon statements made by high-level officials of
the Executive Branch, there the Court only did so as an "exemplar[]" of the
policy embodied within an actual executive agreement.25 At no time did
the Garamendi Court suggest that such statements, in lieu of an actual
executive agreement, have similar preemptive weight. Thus, the presidential
statements in Movsesian are not evidence of "policy," as used by Zschernig
and its progeny, 255 but rather a "statement of intent" to persuade Congress
not to officially recognize the Armenian Genocide.256
B. Norton Simon and the Return of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power
On the same day that Movsesian was decided, the same Ninth Circuit
panel also invalidated section 354.3. The California legislature enacted
section 354.3 to extend the statute of limitations until 2010 for victims of the
province of the federal government has no bearing on the existence of, or conflict with, an express
federal policy applicable to the states." Movsesian, 578 F.3d at 1063 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
253. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416; see also U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2; Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373, 381 (2000) (invalidating a state law in conflict with a congressional act
and express delegation to the President because the "entire scheme of the [state] statute ... [was] an
obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's full objectives"); Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 711-14
(invalidating a California law that extended the statute of limitations on WWII slave labor claims
because it was in conflict with federal policy expressed in a number of treaties and international
agreements entered into by the United States to resolve the war and disputes arising from it);
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (Even "plainly compelling" Presidential foreign policy
"do[es] not allow [the Court] to set aside first principles. The President's authority to act, as with the
exercise of any governmental power, 'must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself."' (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585
(1952))). Thus, central to the Court's finding in Medellin was the lack of either a ratified treaty or an
independent source of executive power allowing the President to displace state law. Medellin, 552
U.S. at 525-32. No authority grants executive branch officials "the power to invalidate state law
simply by conveying the Executive's views on matters of federal policy." See Garamendi, 539 U.S.
at 442 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (the majority opinion in Garamendi does not conflict with this
statement); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95 (2009) (the Supreme Court recognized that
preemption of traditional state powers can only be imposed upon the existence of a "clear and
manifest" contrary purpose); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 9 F.3d 807, 812 n.5 (9th Cir.
1993); Wabash Valley Power Ass'n v. Rural Electrification Admin., 903 F.2d 445, 454 (7th Cir.
1990) ("We have not found any case holding that a federal agency may preempt state law without
either rulemaking or adjudication.").
254. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 422.
255. See, e.g., Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1186 (E.D.
Cal. 2007) ("The 'policy' in evidence in Garamendi was evinced by the results of the President's
negotiations and was embodied in an agreement; in Crosby, the 'policy' was embodied in an act of
Congress setting forth specific limited sanctions against a country; in Zschernig, the 'policy' was
evinced by a negotiated treaty that covered the same subject as the state law.").
256. See id. ("The President's commitment to engage in negotiations that include developing
nations does not set any particular goals or means, does not guide the actions of any actors with
respect to greenhouse gas reduction, and imparts no information to guide future actions that may
increase or decrease greenhouse gas production. It is merely a statement of an intent to negotiate on
the terms specified.").
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Holocaust and their heirs to bring claims against California museums to
recover artwork stolen by the Nazis. 257 In Von Saher v. Norton Simon, the
panel held that section 354.3 was preempted under the doctrine of foreign
affairs.258
In May of 1940, when the Nazis invaded the Netherlands, Jacques
Goudstikker fled his home, leaving behind his world-class art collection,
which included the Cranachs painted by Cranach the Elder. 259 The Allied
Forces found the Cranachs outside of Berlin, in the country estate of a Nazi
Reischsmarschall. 260 After the war ended, the Allied Forces were in charge
of restituting the looted art, and President Truman adopted a policy of
"external restitution," where looted art was returned to its country of origin
rather than to individual owners.261 The Allied Forces returned the Cranachs
to the Netherlands, which transferred ownership to George Stroganoff-
Scherbatoff, who claimed they belonged to his family of Russian nobles.262
Stroganoff-Scherbatoff then sold the Cranachs in 1971 to the Norton Simon
Museum in Pasadena, California.263 Von Saher, Goudstikker's daughter-in-
law, filed suit against the Norton Simon under section 354.3 to have the
Cranachs returned.26
The panel affirmed the district court's holding that section 354.3 was
preempted under the doctrine of foreign affairs.265 The Norton Simon panel
first analyzed whether section 354.3 was in conflict with the Executive
Branch policy of external restitution.266  Based on the panel's reading of
Garamendi, that a foreign policy preference can be implied from the other
Executive Branch documents relating to an executive agreement, the panel
found that three documents were relevant: the London Declaration, 267 a
memorandum from a State Department official, and a policy statement
257. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3 (West 2006).
258. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 578 F.3d 1016, 1029 (9th Cir.
2009), amendedby 592 F.3d 954(9th Cir. 2010).
259. Norton Simon, 578 F.3dat 1020-21.
260. Id at 1021.
261. Id. at 1019 (quoting American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and
Historic Monuments in War Areas, Report, 148 (1946)).
262. Norton Simon, 578 F.3d at 1021; Boehm, supra note 22.
263. Norton Simon, 578 F.3d at 1021.
264. Id. at 1020; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3(a}-(c) (West 2006).
265. Norton Simon, 578 F.3d at 1018.
266. Id. at 1022-25.
267. The London Declaration "explicitly reserved [to the Allies] the right to invalidate wartime
transfers of property." Id. at 1023. The Declaration "ha[d] been credited by some with laying the
foundation for the United States'[s] postwar restitution policy," even though it "does not explicitly
address restitution or reparations." Id.
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approved by President Harry S. Truman in 1945 entitled the "Art Objects in
U.S. Zone."268 However, as U.S. involvement in the restitution process
ended on September 15, 1948, the panel concluded that there was no current
policy in place to conflict with section 354.3 .269 "[H]ad the California
statute been enacted immediately following WWII," the panel added, "it
undoubtedly would have."270
Next, the panel determined whether section 354.3 was nonetheless
preempted under the doctrine of field preemption. 271 Relying on Garamendi
dicta,272 the panel determined that "a traditional statutory 'field' preemption
analysis" was appropriate when a state, by enacting a regulation outside of
its traditional area of responsibility, interfered with the federal government's
conduct of foreign affairs.
The panel proceeded into a two-part inquiry: first, whether section 354.3
regulated a traditional state responsibility, 2 74 and second, whether it intruded
into an area vested in the federal government. 275 The panel determined that,
even though property is traditionally regulated by the states, section 354.3
was not "a garden variety property regulation" because the statute's real
purpose "was to create a friendly forum for litigating Holocaust restitution
claims, open to anyone in the world to sue a museum or gallery located
within or without the state."276 The panel reached this conclusion by
observing that section 354.3 was amended prior to its enactment to remove
the language "museums and galleries in California" from the definition of
entities against whom suit could be brought.277 California's real desiderata
268. See id. at 1023-24. Under the Art Objects in U.S. Zone policy statement, President Truman
"set[] forth the standard operating procedures governing the looted artwork found within the U.S.
zone of occupation." Id at 1024. Rather than restituting directly to individuals, this policy required
that looted artwork was to be restituted to the "country of origin," which had the duty of returning
the art to its rightful owner. Id. The rationales for this policy, as stated in a State Department
memorandum, were the "complexities of the sham transactions," the impossibility of finding some
of the owners and their heirs, and the "recogn[ition] that the liberated countries themselves had a
stake" in the process. Id.
269. Id
270. Id. at 1025.
271. Id at 1025-29.
272. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419 n.11 (2003).
273. Norton Simon, 578 F.3d at 1025.
274. See id. at 1025-27.
275. See id at 1027-29.
276. Id at 1025-26 (citing Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 426).
277. Id. at 1026-27 (quoting section 354.3(a)); see also Limitations of Actions: Holocaust
Victims: Hearing on AB 1758 Before Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, 2001-2002 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2002) (statements of attorney E. Randol Shoenberg) ("For some reason, the proposed
legislation is limited in application to museums or galleries 'located in the State of California.' This
territorial limitation .. . should be eliminated. Jurisdiction over defendants in California courts is
already restricted by the Constitution of California and of the United States, as set forth in the Code
of Civil Procedure section 410.10 [stating that California courts may exercise jurisdiction on any
basis not inconsistent with the Constitutions of California or of the United States]. None of the other
statute of limitation sections have jurisdictional limits on the location of defendants to whom the
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in enacting section 354.3, according to the panel, was to express its
dissatisfaction with the federal government's method of restitution "[b]y
opening its doors as a forum to all Holocaust victims and their heirs to bring
Holocaust claims in California against 'any museum or gallery' whether
located in the state or not . . Thus, "California can make no serious
claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility." 279
Next, the panel concluded that the Constitution expressly reserved the
power to make and resolve war in the federal government. 280 Even though
section 354.3 was directed against museums and galleries, not "former
wartime enemies," its purpose, the panel argued, was to "establish[] a
remedy for wartime injuries."281  Therefore, there was "no room" for
California to legislate.282 Holding otherwise would "require California
courts to review acts of restitution made by foreign governments.",283
1. In Search of Limits: The Dormant Commerce Clause
Norton Simon illustrates the dangers of non-textual principles such as
the dormant foreign affairs power. The Ninth Circuit enlarged the Zschernig
doctrine without regard to its context; specifically, the statute at issue in
Zschernig was "aimed directly at," and provoked the sensitivities of, foreign
nations.284 Professors Denning and Ramsey argue that this area of the law is
limitations rule applies. Mr. Schoenberg goes on to give the example of a Holocaust survivor living
in California who has discovered a piece of his family's artwork at the Metropolitan Museum in
New York. Existing law allows California courts to exercise jurisdiction under the 'minimum
contacts' test, so long as the contacts of the non-resident and the state are such that the exercise of
such jurisdiction does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'
(International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.) Thus existing law would allow a
suit against the Metropolitan Museum to be brought in California, as the Museum does business and
is licensed by the Secretary of State to do business in California."). But see id. at 1032 (Pregerson,
J., dissenting) ("A reasonable reading of 'any museum or gallery' would limit section 354.3 to
entities subject to the jurisdiction of the State of California. Because California has a 'serious claim
to be addressing a traditional state responsibility,' it is clear that Garamendi requires us to apply
conflict preemption, not field preemption." (citations omitted)).
278. Norton Simon, 578 F.3d at 1027.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1029.
283. Id at 1028. But see Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (action to recover
six Klimt paintings from Austrian Gallery which allegedly had either been seized by the Nazis or
expropriated by the Austrian Republic after World War II required the Ninth Circuit to review
restitution made by Republic of Austria).
284. See Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1188 (E.D. Cal.
2007) ("In Zschernig, Garamendi, and Crosby, conflict was found because the preempted state law
was aimed directly at a foreign country, and because the state law was aimed directly at some aspect
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prone to a concept they call "doctrine creep."285 Doctrine creep occurs when
new principles of law are justified by precedent, yet the important facts or
limiting language utilized in those cases are ignored.28 6 For example, in her
dissent in Garamendi, Justice Ginsburg suggested that the dormant foreign
affairs power should be limited in a manner generally consistent with the
facts which gave rise to Justice Souter's holding in Zschernig.2 87
Preemption under the dormant foreign affairs power, Justice Ginsberg
declared, "resonates most audibly when a state action 'reflect[s] a state
policy critical of foreign governments and involve[s] 'sitting in judgment'
on them."' 288 Justice Ginsberg also expressed a more general concern over
judges becoming "the expositors of the Nation's foreign policy."289
Whether or not Justice Ginsberg's recommendation-limiting the dormant
foreign affairs power to Zschernig's facts-is sufficient to prevent judicial
overreaching and to preserve the ability of states to legislate in favor of their
citizens is debatable. After all, Zschernig itself has historically been the
subject of judicial and scholarly criticism because of the lack of textual
underpinnings to support its holding. This Comment will explore another
of that foreign country's conduct that was the subject of United States foreign policy activity. Here,
that is not the case. The [disputed regulations] are aimed internally at the state's traditional role in
the regulation of what may be sold in the state and at corporations, not nations, that manufacture
items for the state's market."); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 433 (1968) ("State courts, of
course, must frequently read, construe, and apply laws of foreign nations. It has never been
seriously suggested that state courts are precluded from performing that function, albeit there is a
remote possibility that any holding may disturb a foreign nation-whether the matter involves
commercial cases, tort cases, or some other type of controversy.").
285. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 869.
286. Id. For example, Professors Denning and Ramsey argue that the Garamendi decision calls
into question the "common law constitutional interpretation" method, where case law, rather than
constitutional text, history, or structure, "does the heavy lifting of constitutional decisionmaking."
Id.
287. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 439 (2003) (Ginsberg, J. dissenting). Other
scholars have proposed their own limitations to the dormant foreign affairs power. See, e.g., Pozo,
supra note 243 (suggesting that the dormant foreign affairs power should be reconceptualized as part
of a broad foreign affairs power spectrum, which includes conflict preemption, as a way of
comprehensively uniting precedent). Professor Reinstein proposes that the scope of the implied
presidential powers raised by Youngstown cannot be greater than the historical limits of prerogative
power imposed on the King of England. Reinstein, supra note 60, at 312-23. First, he argued that
Chief Justice Marshall's structural approach in McCulloch v. Maryland should be employed by tying
the implied powers of the President to those specifically enumerated in Article II. Id Second, the
implied powers are subject to the following limitations: (1) the President can neither change
domestic law nor create or alter existing legal obligations without congressional authorization; (2)
the President's implied powers are subject to regulation by Congress; and (3) a conflict between
implied presidential power and congressional legislation should be resolved in favor of Congress.
Id. In regards to the foreign affairs powers, Professor Reinstein stated that "the President may
establish and implement the nation's foreign policy and effectuate that policy through a broad range
of methods, including executive agreements with other countries," however, this power should be
subject to the aforementioned limitations as well. Id. at 264-65.
288. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 439 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting HENKIN, supra note 33, at
164).
289. Id. at 442.
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option.
The "negative" or "dormant Commerce Clause" doctrine is a reasonable
place to turn to for sensible limitations because it parallels the dormant
affairs power. 2" The dormant Commerce Clause, like the dormant foreign
affairs power, is a power implicitly withheld from states as a "negative
implication" to a positive grant of power to the federal government.291
Furthermore, two of the principal reasons the Founders called for the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 was because, under the Articles of
Confederation Congress, there was a lack of federal authority "to effectively
control foreign policy and defense," 292 and because commerce between the
states "had become chaotic as many states had erected barriers to interstate
trade in an effort to protect business enterprise for [their] own citizens."293
Further, when the majority in Garamendi adopted its balancing test-that "it
would be reasonable to consider the strength of the state interest" to
determine how great a conflict is needed to preempt state law-the Court
looked to dormant Commerce Clause precedent 294 and scholarship which
suggested the implementation of "a test that 'balance[s] the state's interest in
a regulation against the impact on U.S. foreign relations."' 295  Practically
speaking, the dormant Commerce Clause has been litigated more than the
dormant foreign affairs power; therefore, the Court has been better able to
290. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 849; RAMSEY, supra note 60, at 273-81 (drawing
comparisons to the dormant Commerce Clause in his search for the text and historical meaning
behind the dormant foreign affairs power); THE FEDERALIST No. 42, supra note 44 (James Madison)
(comparing foreign commerce and foreign affairs); Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-Era
Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37 (2005) (providing a historical defense for the dormant Commerce Clause).
291. See RAMSEY, supra note 60, at 273.
292. See Pozo, supra note 243, at 594. In fact, the first thirty-three Federalist papers included at
least some discussion of foreign affairs. See id.
293. Peter A. Lauricella, The Real "Contract with America": The Original Intent of the Tenth
Amendment and the Commerce Clause, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1377, 1397 (1997).
294. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420 (citing S. Pac. Co. v. Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 768-
79 (1945) (under the negative Commerce Clause, "reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state
and national power is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommodation of the competing
demands of the state and national interests involved").
295. Id. (quoting HENKIN, supra note 33, at 164); see also Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential
Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208, 220-21 (1959) ("[T]he Court has
adopted the same weighing of interests approach in pre-emption cases that it uses to determine
whether a state law unjustifiably burdens interstate commerce. In a number of situations the Court
has invalidated statutes on the pre-emption ground when it appeared that the state laws sought to
favor local economic interests at the expense of the interstate market. On the other hand, when the
Court has been satisfied that valid local interests, such as those in safety or in the reputable operation
of local business, outweigh the restrictive effect on interstate commerce, the Court has rejected the
pre-emption argument and allowed state regulation to stand.").
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296interpret its proper scope.
The basis for the dormant Commerce Clause is Article I of the
Constitution, which expressly grants Congress the "Power. . . To regulate
Commerce. . . among the several States." 29 7 By negative implication, states
are excluded from enacting legislation that improperly burdens or
discriminates against interstate commerce, even in the absence of a
conflicting federal statute.298 The rationale for this doctrine is "to prohibit
state or municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism, laws
that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution
was designed to prevent." 299
If a state regulation burdens interstate commerce, the regulation is
subject to scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause.oo In this situation,
"'discrimination' simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-
state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter."301
If the purpose or effect of a discriminatory law is "simple economic
protectionism," it is subject to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity," 302 which
can only be overcome by a showing that the State has no other means to
advance a legitimate local purpose.303 Conversely, "evenhanded" statutes
that only impose "incidental" burdens on interstate commerce will also be
struck down if, under the Bruce Church balancing test, "the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
296. Note, however, that the only interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause on which all the
Justices appear to agree is found in New Energy Co. oflnd v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (state
statutes discriminating against interstate commerce will normally be unconstitutional). See VARAT,
COHEN & AMAR, supra note 102; see also Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional
Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43 (1988) (citing the criticisms of the Court's use of the commerce clause
and largely defending the Court).
297. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
298. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824) (the power to regulate interstate
commerce "can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of
agents, or lie dormant"); Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 (1829) ("We do
not think that the [state] act empowering the Black Bird Creek Marsh Company to place a dam
across the creek, can, under all the circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to the
power to regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the
subject.").
299. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994); see also Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) ("[The Commerce Clause is] framed upon the theory
that . . . [as to economics] the several states must sink or swim together. . . .").
300. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338
(2007); Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005); Fort Gratiot
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
301. United Haulers Ass'n, 550 U.S. at 338; Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Or.,
511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988).
302. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981) (quoting City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)); see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver.
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
303. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); see also Brown-Forman Distillers v. N.Y. State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
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benefits." " The degree of the burden will "depend on the nature of the
local interest involved and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities."30s The threshold question is whether
the burden created by the statute is "clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits."306
Thus, for example, a state regulation which banned the intrastate sale of
milk in plastic non-returnable, non-refillable containers, yet allowed the sale
of nonreturnable, non-refillable containers made from other products to
continue was not facially invalid because it prohibited all retailers, whether
or not they were from outside the state. 07 The benefit of minimizing waste
was significant and the burden imposed by this statute was minimal because
milk could still be distributed throughout the state by out-of-state retailers. 308
2. An Argument Against the Balancing Test
A number of justices have argued that courts should abandon the
balancing test altogether when resolving dormant Commerce Clause
disputes and allow even-handed state regulations to exist unless or until
Congress says otherwise. 309  This notion is first stated as a principle in
Sproles v. Binford by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes when he wrote
that "in matters admitting of diversity of treatment, according to the special
requirements of local conditions, the states may act within their respective
jurisdictions until Congress sees fit to act."310  Later, this principle is
invoked apologetically by Justice Douglass in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
Inc.:
This is one of those cases-few in number-where local safety
measures that are nondiscriminatory place an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce. This conclusion is especially
underlined by the deleterious effect which the Illinois law will have
304. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). But see Bendix Autolite Corp. v.
Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("This process is ordinarily
called 'balancing,' . . . but the scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests on both
sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular
rock is heavy." (citation omitted)).
305. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 142.
306. Id.
307. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 471-72.
308. Id. at 472.
309. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
310. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 390 (1932).
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on the "interline" operation of interstate motor carriers. The
conflict between the Arkansas regulation and the Illinois regulation
also suggests that this regulation of mudguards is not one of those
matters "admitting of diversity of treatment, according to the special
requirements of local conditions," to use the words of Chief Justice
Hughes in Sproles v. Binford.31 1
This approach was later articulated by Justice Scalia in his concurrence
in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.312 In Bendix, Ohio
enacted a law which tolled the statute of limitations, normally four years, for
breach of contract or fraud claims against entities that were not "present"
within the state.3 13 For a foreign corporation to be present in Ohio, it must
have "appoint[ed] an agent for service of process." 314 The majority opinion,
penned by Justice Kennedy, "might have" concluded the statute as per se
invalid but instead decided to apply the Bruce Church balancing test and
found the statute unconstitutional nonetheless.315
Justice Scalia concurred in judgment but argued that the Bruce Church
balancing test should be abandoned.316 Justice Scalia wrote that he could
not understand how the "exposure to the general jurisdiction of Ohio's
courts [was] 'a significant burden' on commerce."317 After all, the number
of parties affected by Ohio's statute was not before the Court, and even
Midwesco was subject to Ohio's long-arm statute. As a practical matter,
Justice Scalia doubted that the degree of the burden was as large as the
majority contemplated, considering the risks of death and dissolution of
prospective defendants, the lack of prejudgment interest, and the "staleness
of evidence." 319  Nevertheless, Scalia conceded that in reality both he and
311. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959).
312. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988); see also Camps
Newfound/Owatonna Inc. v. Town of Harrison, ME., 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
313. Bendix, 486 U.S at 898.
314. Id; OR. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (2009), repealed by 1969 Or. Laws ch. 591 § 305.
315. Bendix, 486 U.S. at 891. Under this test, according to the majority, the burden on foreign
corporations was significant because it forced them to "choose between ... forfeiture of the
limitations defense" or subjecting them "to the general jurisdiction of Ohio courts" in all
transactions, "including those in which [the foreign corporations] did not have the minimum contacts
necessary for supporting personal jurisdiction." Id. at 893. Further, the benefit provided by the
regulation was negligible considering that "the Ohio long-arm statute would have permitted service
on Midwesco throughout the period of limitations." Id. at 894. As the majority found no significant
benefit to offset the inconsistent standards to which in-state and out-of-state corporations were
exposed, the Ohio statute was invalidated. Id.
316. Id at 897 (Scalia, J., concurring).
317. Id at 895.
318. Id at 895-96.
319. Id at 896.
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the majority were simply speculating and "an opinion could as persuasively
have been written coming out the opposite way." 320
Justice Scalia placed the blame on the unpredictable nature of balancing
tests.321 "[T]he essence of the courts' function as the nonpolitical branch" is
to engage in balancing tests "when determining how far the needs of the
State can intrude upon the liberties of the individual."322 However, when it
comes to balancing state interests against "the needs of interstate
commerce," courts are "'ill suited to the judicial function."' 323 Scalia urged
that the Bruce Church test should be abandoned and "essentially legislative
judgments" should be left to Congress.324 The benefit of adopting such an
approach, Scalia argued, would do no damage to stare decisis, as the current
system is unpredictable anyway, and therefore "no expectations can possibly
be upset." 325 Instead, Scalia proposed the following rule:
In my view, a state statute is invalid under the Commerce Clause if,
and only if, it accords discriminatory treatment to interstate
commerce in a respect not required to achieve a lawful state
purpose. When such a validating purpose exists, it is for Congress
and not us to determine it is not significant enough to justify the
burden on commerce.326
Applying this test, the Ohio statute would have been invalidated because
it was facially discriminatory; it only applied to out-of-state corporations and
a more narrowly tailored statute could have been construed to reach the
same objectives by tolling the claims of only those entities "beyond the
reach of Ohio's long-arm statute, or against all persons that could not be
found for mail service."327
3. Norton Simon Revisited
The reasoning employed by Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Douglass
320. Id. at 896-97.
321. Id.at897.
322. Id.
323. Id. (quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
324. Id.
325. Id. at 898.
326. Id. Justice Scalia's statement is made without attribution to Justice Hughes primarily
because the law invalidated in Bendix was discriminatory. However, it clearly belongs to the
principle announced by Justice Hughes.
327. Bendix, 486 U.S. at 898 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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and Scalia is equally persuasive in the realm of the dormant foreign affairs
power. Rather than embarking on an imperfect inquiry into whether or not
the state is acting in an area of traditional competence and balancing those
interests against those of the national government, courts should only
preempt state laws if they interfere with the federal government's conduct of
foreign affairs in a manner not required to achieve a lawful state purpose.328
When such a validating purpose exists, Congress and the President can
either individually enact a law or sign an executive agreement, or
collectively enter into a treaty to preempt the law. An argument can be
made that, as the federal government has the authority to speak with one
voice on matters of foreign affairs, it should also be able to remain silent if it
so chooses. While this may be true, if courts are forced to interpret
congressional silence, there is a great danger that courts will misconstrue
"evidence that the preeminent speaker decided to yield the floor to others" as
evidence of an affirmative display of federal foreign policy. 329  Finally, as
328. This approach is consistent with recent scholarship which has shifted away from the line-
drawing of dual federalism to the recognition of a multiplicity of voices by way of overlapping
jurisdiction in foreign and international affairs. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International
Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons from Coordination, 73 Mo. L. REV. 1185, 1219 (2008)
[hereinafter Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs] (questioning the notion that effective engagement in foreign
affairs requires that a nation speak with a single, national-level voice and, instead, advocates
"horizontal coordination"-a group standard-setting, network organization-among sub-national
actors); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American
Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 91
(2004) (examining the relationship of international law to the U.S. constitutional system and arguing
that recourse to international sources is the natural development of a maturing legal system that is
becoming increasingly interconnected to transnational legal relations); Paul Schiff Berman, Global
Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1177 (2007) (Professor Berman has arguably gone the
furthest in exploring the nuances of these patterns, under the rubric of "legal pluralism"); Kirsten H.
Engel, Harnessing the Benefits ofDynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMoRY L.J. 159
(2006) (arguing that a static allocation of authority between the state and federal government is
inconsistent with the process of policymaking in our federal system and deprives citizens of the
benefits of overlapping jurisdiction); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence,
Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment's
interpretive history supports the use of foreign and international law in deciding what is "cruel and
unusual" punishment); Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and
Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107 (2004) (arguing against complete preemption of
state corporate law because state-level regulation may provide some advantages over federal
regulation); Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and
Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31 (2007)
(arguing that the role played by trans-local organizations of public officials is underappreciated by
current federalism scholarship). Beginning the preemption inquiry by determining which roles states
traditionally play deprives states of the opportunity to provide for the constantly evolving needs of
their citizens. Instead, the analysis should be framed as whether the state is infringing in an area
enumerated to the federal government.
329. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 329 (1994); Itel
Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 81 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) ("[The President] is better able to decide than we are which state regulatory
interests should currently be subordinated to our national interest in foreign commerce. Under the
Constitution, however, neither he nor we were to make that decision, but only Congress."); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 577 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The problem with this approach is not
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with the dormant Commerce Clause cases, adapting this rule would not
damage stare decisis, as the current system is unpredictable regardless.330
Had the Ninth Circuit in Norton Simon adopted an analogous rule to the
approach articulated in Bendix by Justice Scalia, the California law
undoubtedly would not have been preempted because, as the panel stated,
there was no conflicting supreme law or executive agreement currently in
place.3 Indeed, this analysis is comparable to the approach taken by the
Court in Barclays Bank Plc v. Franchise Tax Board,332 a dormant foreign
commerce power case. In Barclays Bank, California adopted a "worldwide
combined reporting" method to determine how much a multinational
corporation doing business in the state should pay in corporate franchise
tax.333  Even though California's method was different from the federal
method, which employed a "separate accounting method," Justice Ginsberg,
writing for the majority, held that this did not "prevent the Federal
Government from speaking with 'one voice' in international trade."334 Justice
Ginsburg concluded that Congress was aware that states were employing the
taxation scheme adopted by California and knew that foreign nations
"deplor[ed]" its use, yet Congress neither passed any law nor enacted any
treaty. 3 As Congress had "refrained from exercising its authority," the Court
determined that the presidential statements aimed at influencing an
unreceptive Congress were "not evidence that the practice interfered with the
Nation's ability to speak with one voice, but is rather evidence that the
preeminent speaker decided to yield the floor to others."336 The argument that
California's method of taxation was "unconstitutional because it [was] likely
to provoke retaliatory action by foreign governments," Justice Ginsburg wrote,
was "directed to the wrong forum." 337 More importantly, statements, actions,
only that it steps out of the courts' modest and limited role in a democratic society; but that by
repeatedly doing what it thinks the political branches ought to do it encourages their lassitude and
saps the vitality of government by the people.").
330. See Bendx, 486 U.S. at 898 (Scalia, J., concurring).
331. Von Saber v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 578 F.3d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir.
2009).
332. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
333. Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 301-03 (internal quotation marks omitted).
334. Id. at 302-03 (internal quotation marks omitted).
335. Id. at 320, 324-25.
336. Id. at 329.
337. Id. at 316-17, 327-28. Seven countries expressed their disapproval by sending diplomatic
notes and filing amici briefs supporting Barclays Bank. Id. at 324 n.22. The United Kingdom even
enacted retaliatory legislation. Id. Nevertheless, the Court held that only Congress, not the
President or the judiciary, has the authority "to evaluate whether the national interest is best served
by . . . uniformity, or state autonomy." Id. at 328-29, 331. Noting that "[t]he judiciary is not vested
with the power" to decide how to balance the competing concerns involved, id. at 328, the Court
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and amicus filings made by the President were not sufficient to unilaterally
preempt state law because "Executive Branch communications that express
federal policy but lack the force of law cannot render unconstitutional
California's otherwise valid, congressionally condoned" scheme.338
V. THE PERILS OF NON-TEXTUAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS
Absent sensible limitations to the non-textual doctrines of the executive
agreement and the dormant foreign affairs power, the ability of courts to
preempt otherwise valid state laws will have negative effects on both
federalism and on separation of powers concerns.
A. The Supremacy Clause
As they stand, the Ninth Circuit's decisions in both Movsesian and
Norton Simon are deleterious to states' rights because they lack any of the
democratic procedural safeguards required of the "supreme Law[s] of the
Land."339 For example, before the Constitution can be amended, the
Constitution requires a ratification process similar to the original ratification
of the Constitution.3 40  Before a federal statute can be enacted, the
Constitution requires a vote by a majority of both Houses and approval by
the President or a two-thirds vote by the Senate. 34' Further, before a treaty
can become law, the President must submit it for approval by the Senate.342
Under Medellin, the Court imposed a requirement that the Executive Branch
can independently preempt state law only while settling a civil claim with
foreign entities. By absolving the requirement for the existence of an actual
executive agreement, the Movsesian panel effectively circumvents Medellin
and its safeguards entirely. Essentially, equal weight-in terms of
preemptive effect-is given to a few speeches as to a treaty deliberated and
compromised by both houses of Congress and signed by the President.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit has revived the post-Garamendi fear that, where
the Executive was acting absent any independent authority or congressional
direction, the executive agreement would make the treaty irrelevant.343 Prior
to Medellin, the Court in Dames & Moore and Garamendi only required
presumed that a lack of "specific indications of congressional intent to bar" state law affecting
foreign commerce indicates "Congress'[s] willingness to tolerate" such law. Id. at 324, 327; see also
id. at 332 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Court's decision "requires no more than legislative
inaction to establish that 'Congress implicitly has permitted' state's law (quoting id. at 326)
(majority opinion)).
338. Id. at 330 (majority opinion).
339. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Clark, supra note 97, at 1597.
340. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.; U.S. CONST. art. V.
341. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
342. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
343. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 908-10.
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evidence of congressional acquiescence to the independent executive action.
After Medellin, the Court required proof of "systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before
questioned."3 44  Movsesian effectively favors the more relaxed approach
outlined in Garamendi, absent the more stringent Medellin standard, leaving
states with no "clear, confident expectation[]" of what types of laws a state
could enter into.345  For example, if a state were to enact environmental
legislation using the words "climate change," should these statutes be
preempted merely because the Executive Branch had a policy against using
such words, yet had no treaty or executive agreement in place stating so?346
Or, in the alternative, if a state chose not to acknowledge "climate change,"
could a speech by the President preempt that state's law?3 47
In Norton Simon, the same conclusions hold true. The structure of the
federal system and states' involvement in the political process protect states
344. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531 (2008).
345. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the
Massachusetts law prohibiting state entities from purchasing goods or services from corporations
doing business with Burma was unconstitutional in part on the ground that it interfered with the
dormant foreign affairs power. See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.
1999); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass. 1998). The
Supreme Court affirmed on the narrower ground of field preemption based on a congressional law
enacted three months after the Massachusetts statute was passed. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000); Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-167; Pozo, supra note 243,
at 600.
346. Cf Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 2006 WL 2734359 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2006)
(suit alleging that regulation of motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions is preempted by the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act and under the implied federal foreign affairs power; the District Court
denied defendant's 12(c) motion, finding that plaintiffs had stated a claim); Green Mountain
Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge v. Torti, No. 2:05CV00302 (D.V.T. filed Nov. 18, 2005) (suit alleging
that regulation of motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions is preempted by the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act and under the implied federal foreign affairs power). To what degree is a state
acting within an area of traditional competence, for example, when California joined several
Canadian provinces, the European Union, France, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, the United
Kingdom, and others to establish the International Carbon Action Partnership, "a group seeking to
promote a 'cap-and-trade' regime for carbon emissions." See Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, supra note
328, at 1186; Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin & Joseph Frueh, Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level:
Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Transnational Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50
ARIz. L. REv. 709 (2008). Other states and municipalities across the United States have also taken
action independent of the federal government to address climate change. See Ahdieh, Foreign
Affairs, supra note 328, at 1186; Resnik, supra note 328, at 62. Over 800 mayors have endorsed the
Kyoto Protocol after the federal government refused to do so. See Resnik, Civin & Frueh, supra, at
719-20.
347. See H.J.R. Res. 12, 2010 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010); Suzanne Goldberg, Utah Delivers Vote of
No Confidence for "Climate Alarmists," THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 12, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2010/feb/12/utah-climate-alarmists.
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from overreaching by the federal government.348 Essentially removing the
minimal restrictions placed on the dormant foreign affairs power by
Zschernig-the state law must encourage criticism of a foreign nation that
would be deleterious to federal interests to be preempted-unnecessarily
expands an already expansive doctrine. In an ever-globalizing world, if
states are completely barred from pressing any interest that touches upon
foreign affairs, their power to provide for their citizens will be severely
undermined. Thus, these citizens are effectively left voiceless because of the
greater hurdle of petitioning a federal official to redress the concerns of a
relative few. As a result, the Supremacy Clause itself becomes
superfluous.349
1. Separation of Powers
The panel's decisions also affect the concept of separation of powers. If
the President can overturn state law unilaterally, then the executive in a
sense becomes a law maker. 3 0  As preemptive weight implies legislative
authority, giving preemptive weight to the foreign policy preferences of the
Executive Branch incorrectly places mere policy statements on the same
level as the Constitution, treaties, and acts of Congress.351 Thus, these
statements are elevated to the status of law without any of the procedural
safeguards mandated by the Constitution to secure the democratic process.
As a result, the need to acquire the cooperation of Congress
disappears.352 If states are removed from the legislative process, if their
statutes could be displaced without the cooperation of the federal
government, then an important check on the President's authority is
removed. It is easier for individuals to "get the ear of some state
governments" than it is to get federal attention.5 Therefore, individuals are
less likely to get their agendas passed. Where the President disapproves of
348. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1990); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985) ("It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal
Government was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress.").
349. See Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J.
649, 688-92 (2002) (arguing that states should be permitted to participate to a greater degree in
foreign affairs).
350. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 908. James Madison addressed this concern in
Federalist No. 47 when he wrote, "[t]he accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and
judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed,
or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47,
supra note 44, at 324, 326 (James Madison). The Constitution, he argued, would not be susceptible
to such pitfalls because "[t]he magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of
himself make a law, though he can put a negative on every law, nor administer justice in person,
though he has the appointment of those who do administer it." Id.
351. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 45, at 908.
352. Id. at 903-05.
353. Id at 906.
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the policy employed by the state, he can secure the consent of the majority
of Congress to preempt this law. However, under the rules furthered by the
Ninth Circuit, the President can act alone, and Congress is "reduced to the
difficult position of assembling a blocking supermajority."3 54 This places an
extremely powerful weapon in a "branch that is much more likely to wield it
aggressively." 5 As Justice Jackson stated in Youngstown: "The example of
such unlimited executive power that must have most impressed the
forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III, and the description
of its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt that they
were creating their new Executive in his image."3 56
By sidestepping the limitations imposed by Medellin, the panel
interferes with the ability of the legislature to maintain what James Madison
calls a "will of its own" by reducing its ability to maintain the "necessary
constitutional means . .. to resist encroachment[]" by the Executive
Branch. 1
VI. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to know exactly what the Founders had in mind when they
drafted the Constitution, and the further removed each generation is from the
impetus of the American Revolution increases this difficulty. Any
interpretation of these documents must be "divined from materials almost as
enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A
century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net
result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources
on each side of any question."
For decades, the Court has addressed the question of whether in the
absence of an explicit federal foreign policy, states are emboldened to
provide for their citizens or are simply constrained by the Executive's
predominant role in this field. Relying at various times upon the
354. Id.
355. Id. at 937; William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands
and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 510 (2008) (arguing that the other two branches of the
federal government receive more judicial inquiry); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch,
105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1732-33 (1996) (stating that, in separation of powers cases, the Court generally
rules in favor of the executive branch); O'Donnell, supra note 125, at 96 (arguing that the Supreme
Court is "reluctant to examine the President's implied powers vis-A-vis Congress" because it fears
touching on "political questions").
356. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
357. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 44, at 348-49 (James Madison).
358. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Constitution, other texts by the Founders, and concepts of nationhood that is
said to be implicit in these documents, the Court has created an amorphous
standard that ebbs and flows depending upon the demographic of the Court.
This is the inherent danger of relying upon extra-constitutional doctrines
because they have no limitation.
As states become more and more involved with international affairs, the
extent of their permissible authority needs to be clearly delineated. The
Roberts Court provided such a rule in its interpretation of the executive
agreement in Medellin. However, without a similar limitation on the
dormant foreign affairs power, this limitation is essentially meaningless.
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